

Person, love and act in Karol Wojtyla

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by Fr. Roger Landry in 2000, for the personal use of students.*

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Classes 1 & 2

Introduction

Fr. Merecki is a Polish Salvatorian from the University of Lublin. He studied philosophy with Tadeusz Stychen who was Wojtyla's successor in the chair of ethics at Lublin. He came into deep contact with the philosophy of Wojtyla there. He will speak of this philosophy in this course. The philosophy of Wojtyla was developed over several years, but especially in his most work, *The Acting Person*. This work is his masterpiece and the first point of reference in this course. A few months ago an excellent bilingual edition was published which has a better Italian edition. Some of the errors of previous editions were corrected. The English edition was edited by someone who phenomenologized the language of Wojtyla too much. There is a corrected English edition, but it has not been published yet except in Lichtenstein.

When we speak of the philosophy of Karol Wojtyla we speak of anthropology, the philosophy of man. He was always attracted by the philosophy of man, by anthropology. The philosopher is struck by the otherness of man in this world. Man exists in a completely other way in confrontation with all other beings. The Logos of man is other. We need a reflection that is not just an empirical analysis of man — biological, or cultural anthropology, or empirical anthropology — but man's specificity, the Logos of man, requires a special method, one that exceeds the empirical data.

Connected with this special Logos of man, we also have a special ethos of man. Man is a person who requires a special attitude and treatment. From him arises the whole ethical and moral question. This leads to personalism and the personalistic norm. In terms of the *Acting Person*, when we read the introduction, we see that Wojtyla says that in this work, we put the moral question outside of parentheses. He wanted to write a special work dedicated to ethics. He didn't write something like *The Acting Person*, but a 100 page work on *Man and Responsibility*. This is found in Italian that collects various writings of Wojtyla, *Perché Uomo?* published by Leonardo edited by Serretti in 1995. This writing gives us a certain vision of the ethics of Wojtyla as he wanted to develop it.

There is a vision of philosophy as a whole in this framework of philosophy. It begins with man but is developed within the framework of philosophy as a whole, beginning with man's experience. Wojtyla didn't have the time to develop this philosophy in a full way. Perhaps this is a task that awaits being done. There's a book by Josef Seifert, *Being and Person*, that takes up this personalistic tendency of Wojtyla in a 1000 page book. He tried to pursue Wojtyla's perspective enriching philosophy as a whole.

Outline

This course will be divided in three parts. We'll begin today with a general framework. Then we will speak for three meetings on the Christological framework of Wojtyla. We'll start with St. John of the Cross and his mystical theology, on which Wojtyla dedicated his dissertation (on the act of the faith). He won't focus so much on mysticism, but we'll try to give some accents to the future philosophical vision of Wojtyla. We will then cover Wojtyla's encounter with St. Thomas. This is very important for Wojtyla's future vision. In the new Italian edition of *Person and Act*, there is a translation that puts Wojtyla within the context of philosophy by underlining his links with Thomism. Then we will speak of his encounter with Max Scheler, which was the current philosophical trend at the time and went by the name of phenomenology. It was an attempt to return to the things themselves as given in experience. Scheler's phenomenology will leave a very deep imprint on the thought of Karol Wojtyla. His whole philosophy will be an attempt to connect and make a synthesis of ontology from St. Thomas and phenomenology from Scheler's method. We will focus on Wojtyla's philosophical method, particularly on his concept of experience.

He used experience systematically. Hegel and Spinoza had a coherent deductive system of thought, but Wojtyła wanted to demonstrate everything by referring to experience. Wojtyła didn't want to speak on abstract norms. He wanted to show how norms are rooted in human experience. Then we will speak of some of the most important concepts in the work of Wojtyła. We'll tackle his notion of conscience, freedom, the transcendence and integration of the position, and intersubjectivity. The last section of *The Acting Person* is dedicated to participation. After the publication of *The Acting Person*, there were several articles written by him on the problem of intersubjectivity.

Bibliography

We turn now briefly to what literature will help us. There are many works dedicated to the thought of Karol Wojtyła. We can't list them all, but there isn't a need to learn them all. We'll mention only the most important. The articles in *Perché Uomo?* are important. In terms of secondary sources, the most interesting and important book is that of Rocco Buttiglione, *The Thought of Karol Wojtyła (of the man who became John Paul II)*, 1982. This book was translated in several languages. Buttiglione speaks of all of the thought of Wojtyła, not just of his philosophy but also his theology, poetry. The book gives us a large perspective. It's probably the best book that exists. In Italy, in the early 80s, some works were published that put Wojtyła in the context of contemporary thought. There are two collections of articles edited by Buttiglione. *The Philosophy of Karol Wojtyła* (Bologna, 1983) and the other is *Karol Wojtyła and Contemporary European Thought* (Bologna, 1984). These are interesting texts that show various bonds of Wojtyła with contemporary thought. Serretti's introduction to this text is very important. For a broader text on Wojtyła and his thought, there's a book by Grygiel, *Man seen from the Vistula* (1978). In *Angelicum* 2-3, 1979, there was a bibliography of the works of Wojtyła. In English, there are a few books. G. Williams, *The Mind of John Paul: Origins of his Thought and Action*, NY, 1981, by Seabury Press. It does a good job on the Polish context. There's also a book by Kenneth Schmitz, *At the center of the human drama, the philosophical anthropology of Karol Wojtyła, Pope John Paul II* (1993). There is a text by Josef Seifert in *Aletheia* which is called *Karol Wojtyła, Pope John Paul II, at the Krakow-Lublin school of philosophy*. In the next edition of *Aletheia*, there will be a discussion on how we can speak of the Krakow-Lublin school of philosophy. Naturally, there are also many other things that we won't speak of here, but there's a large literature we can consult if we're interested.

Adequate anthropology

The anthropological project of Wojtyła can be called the project of an adequate anthropology. This latter expression is not used by Wojtyła himself in his writings but is used by John Paul II in his Wednesday Catecheses on Human Love. John Paul II speaks of adequate anthropology. What does this expression mean? It is possible to speak of adequate anthropology in two senses.

- 1) Methodologically, an adequate anthropology unites in itself the treatments of man from the point of view of philosophy and of theology. Angelo Scola has spoken of this quite a bit over the years. This vision of man that Wojtyła and John Paul II develops unites these two ways of treating man. But this sense is not the deepest and most important sense for us.
- 2) When Wojtyła speaks of adequate anthropology, he speaks to us because it treats of touching something that he defines as something irreducible in man. He wants to demonstrate that which we can define as the irreducible core of the person. In *Perché Uomo?* there is an article on subjectivity and the irreducibility of man. The original edition was published in English in *Analecta Husserliana* in 1968. This text is programmatic as regards the anthropological vision of Wojtyła. It is fewer than 15 pages. He discusses its roots in Aristotle and Thomas. When he speaks of the historical context of the problem of the irreducibility of man, he says that Aristotle's position that man is a rational animal, which not only defines the human species for Aristotle, but it is structured in a way to exclude the possibility to prove that which is irreducible in man. It has the conviction of the irreducibility of man in the world. This type of comprehension would be called cosmological. Aristotle understood man as a being in the world. This definition is valid. But it treats man above all as an object, as one of the objects in the world.

The question is whether we have to reduce man cosmologically to study him. Do we lose something that is crucial to understand and constitute man? When we look at the history of modern philosophy, it begins in a certain sense

with the discovery of the subjectivity of man in Descartes and developed in rationalism in the 1600s and then in Hegelian movement of the 19th century. All focused on the subjectivity of man. This focus on the subjectivity of man had positive and negative consequences. Descartes said that all knowledge is grounded in the cogito ergo sum. What was human was defined with a certain realization of himself. The *res extensa* of the body belonged simply to the material world of objects that man has. When we go forward in history, we see that philosophy is founded and declared as a construction of man, particularly in Fichte, who said that man places world in being. Sartre tried to identify what was most irreducibly human in man and concluded that it was an absolute freedom. He said existence preceded essence and defined it. For this reason, Catholic philosophy battled this way of doing philosophy and battled the subjective notion of doing philosophy as it was framed by these authors. *Aeterni Patris* was more objective, identified with the philosophy of St. Thomas. The metaphysics of St. Thomas began with being and existence. There were great Thomistic advances by Etienne Gilson and Jacques Maritain. St. Thomas's existential insights were looked to again. Gilson opposes in a very strong way the way Descartes and the way some "Thomists" were doing philosophy. Either Gilson began with conscience and subjectivity or with reality, but neither in itself was sufficient. This is the problem of the bridge. Either there is no way to go from conscience to reality, or you begin with reality and can't quite get to consciousness.

Wojtyla said we cannot ignore modern philosophy and its rediscovery of the subjectivity of man. They rediscovered that there was something more than the world. There needs to be an integration within a metaphysical context. To admit for a subjectivity in philosophy — and admit it as a starting point — doesn't mean it has to end up in subjectivism. For Wojtyla it is very important to underline that this way of treating man in traditional metaphysics is not sufficient. Subjectivity is something irreducible in man. There is an understanding of man that Wojtyla will define as personalist, distinguishing this understanding from a cosmological understanding. In this, experience acquires its full meaning. It is perhaps important to underline this term "experience." Science doesn't allow any real access to experience, even though it has the pretension to explain everything. In the Cartesian vision of reality, this pretense is justified to a certain sense, because *res extensa* is dominated by mechanic laws in science. But there is something lacking, not just in confrontation with mans but with animals as well. Life has an interior and exterior dimension. Thomas Nagle wrote a text in English *What it is to be a bat?* He pointed to something in animal life that exceeds our understanding.

We can say something about this irreducibility. To be irreducible means that something cannot be reduced, but only revealed or shown. By its experience it opposes reduction. But this doesn't mean that it is outside our experience, but it is known in another way, by a proper method. The phenomenological method of analysis allows us to look at experience as irreducible. When we look at *The Acting Person*, Wojtyla begins with the notion of the experience of man. We are in a privileged spot. We are men with interior and exterior experiences. There is an opportunity for us to say something about the irreducibility of man, by describing this personal experience of the core of man and leading toward it. This does not mean that we can say everything here about man's irreducible. Every man is a mystery, because this means that the concept of person and every man possesses his own human nature. We are our body but we also possess it. To be a person means to be in relation to his nature, to possess it, to have the possibility of realizing it or not realizing it. We cannot have knowledge that would affirm every man in his concreteness, because every man is something more, even more than his freedom. We're referring to man's personality. Two years ago a very interesting book appeared by Robert Spaemann entitled *Persons, Wise about the difference between something and someone*, where he explains and demonstrates the concept of the person in a concrete way. This gives the background on the history of the concept.

This was the attempt of Wojtyla as well. When he speaks of the irreducibility of man, his attempt was to do exactly this. He adopts in his philosophy the phenomenological method, not resting at the level of phenomenology which he wanted to exceed, but he found phenomenology a crucial instrument for an adequate anthropology. Wojtyla would make up the term a transphenomenology, beginning but exceeding phenomenology and phenomenologists themselves (like Husserl). Husserl got to the metaphysical status of the objects he was studying, although he veered to the idealistic position that phenomena are the productions of our consciousness. Many of his students didn't agree with this, like Roman Ingarden, who became an intellectual friend with Wojtyla even though he wasn't a believer. Ingarden was convinced that one could demonstrate through phenomenological method the metaphysics

in the world. He chose an interesting path, beginning with what is certainly a construction of man, art. He made with it an aesthetic science. This intention was shared by Wojtyla. Beginning with phenomenology, he tended toward metaphysical, ontological categories. The process was slightly different when he was condemning some reasonings. He generally tried to go from experience to metaphysical principles.

The project of Wojtyla was that of an adequate anthropology that he wanted to develop. He indicated an idea. This development, especially today, is very important. We have the need for a unitary concept of man. We have psychology, sociology, and various other sciences of man, but what is lacking is the unitary concept of who man is. This proposal of Wojtyla is something that is at least interesting. He says this unitary concept of man is something on the basis of which all of the other human sciences can be based. He began here.

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Classes 3-4

In trying to show Wojtyla's attitude toward an adequate anthropology, one which can express that which is most human in man, we will speak of three, maybe four, thinkers. He took several elements from each of them, transforming his own philosophy in the process, both by assimilating some elements and responding to others. We will see first John of the Cross, then Max Scheler, then St. Thomas, then Immanuel Kant.

St. John of the Cross

Karol Wojtyla encountered St. John of the Cross through his friend in Krakow, Jan Tyranowski. Andre Frossard's interview with John Paul II, *Be Not Afraid*, discussed that this meeting with Tyranowski and through him John of the Cross was a certain turn in his life. Tyranowski was a simple person, but he saw that God does not just speak but reveals. Faith for him was not just a collection of content, but something that was a lived faith. In an article of Wojtyla dedicated to Tyranowski in 1949, he said that Tyranowski didn't understand fully the secular dimension of marriage and family. Tyranowski served as a pontifex or bridge-builder for Wojtyla. Wojtyla, when criticizing a thinker, always looks for a bridge to his thoughts, using a "both... and idea" rather than an "either... or." There is often an "and" in Wojtyla's thought, like love and responsibility.

Wojtyla, while in seminary during the war, studied with a professor who was famous and wrote his thesis on John of the Cross. He then transferred here to Rome to go to the Angelicum and wrote his doctoral dissertation on the doctrine of the faith in John of the Cross. This thesis has been translated in various languages. His advisor was Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange.

Why did Wojtyla choose John of the Cross? There was a psychological reason, after the death of the other members of the family, because he gave Wojtyla a communication with the founder of all life, God. There were other reasons as well. There was a certain crisis of civility in Europe. He wrote on his impressions during a summer working in France. Polish Catholicism was fascinated with the Catholic intellectual culture in France, which had not yet been translated into the daily life of the people. There was a new evangelization, a new Christianity, needed, like Maritain was writing at this time. St. John of the Cross was writing in the context of a crisis of Christianity in the life of the people, due to the Protestant reformation. Wojtyla tried to overcome this crisis with a positive and constructive attitude. John of the Cross' attitude was still relevant four hundred years after he wrote it. In Poland, there was the need to defend the faith. They had lost their autonomy, but this was limited, as we know very well. The faith to survive would have to remain a form of the life of the people and John of the Cross could help with this.

The reading of St. John of the Cross done by Wojtyla was guided by two questions. We will concentrate on the points important for us, that lead to an adequate anthropology.

- 1) The first question is who is man. What vision of man emerges from the writings of St. John of the Cross? This is the question of the logos of man.

2) The second question is what can man become. This looks for the ethos of man.

The point of departure for John of the Cross is experience. Wojtyla wrote in an article that the force of the writings of St. John of the Cross came from his experience. This theme of experience was underlined by the language he used. Experience was one of his principle themes. The first chapter of the Acting Person was dedicated to experience. This conception will always remain the most important and deep insight of Wojtyla, that it must remain bound to experience. But there is the question about what type of experience he's talking about. In *The Humanism of St. John of the Cross*, Wojtyla speaks of the external experience of man (biological), which does not lead necessarily toward that which is most essentially human. There is the other dimension of experience for Wojtyla, which is interior. We experience truths within us. This is a privileged approach to man. This is the psychic aspect of man, all that is learned through introspection. But this isn't everything. He mentions the experience of the other, but we won't analyze it here.

When we speak of St. John of the Cross, we see that the experience of which he speaks is mystical experience. He speaks of an experience that happens in the dark night of the faith, of a certain void. It doesn't happen at the psychic level capable of being analyzed by psychology, but at a deeper level, at the level of the interiority of man. Scheler analyzes the emotional aspect of man. St. John of the Cross goes beyond emotions. Man experiences his deepest level in contact with God, something that psychology cannot analyze. We can affirm with Buttiglione that to understand man at the deepest level we have to begin with mystical experience, because we see man's interiority in its purity form. This is paradoxical. Man has a relationship with truth in mystical experience. This relationship with the truth goes beyond human emotivity. There is something more in man. We have to confront the phenomenology of mystical experience. Wojtyla at this time probably didn't know Scheler very well and didn't use the phenomenological method in an explicit way, but when he wrote his thesis, there was a certain element that was not completely Thomistic.

Wojtyla tried to show through an analysis of the mysticism of St. John of the Cross how the faith is subjectivized, how it is given in the experience of the human subject. In a certain way, he goes beyond the Thomistic interpretation of experience that was prevalent at the Angelicum at this time. Wojtyla was conscious of the fact that he was doing something different than Garrigou-Lagrange wanted and held. The latter criticized Wojtyla's use of the expression of the divine received form of intentionality rather than divine object. In mystical theology, one doesn't learn necessarily the object, but the mystic experiences someone who is not an object but a person. This experience is not objectivizable with terms taken from the experience of the world. There is a certain difference between Christian experience and certain heterodox theologians, who try to instrumentalize prayer and experience with God. For St. John of the Cross and Wojtyla, the experience is an encounter of persons, not of an object. There is a reciprocal welcoming. God welcomes man and is welcomed by man. God is not perceived as an object. He thought it was worth it to avoid this expression. Divine intentional form was better for him, despite its limitations, than divine object. St. John of the Cross had a series of terms that came from experience and not from an abstract system of thought. Wojtyla said that St. John of the Cross had to be interpreted from terms within this experience rather than terms taken from the world or from Thomas' experience of the world.

Wojtyla's method here can be described as beginning with the (unconscious) phenomenology of mystical experience. Beginning with this phenomenology, he goes toward a deeper perception at the metaphysical level. Wojtyla doesn't stop at describing mystical experience, but he tries to arrive at the deep structure of man. He speaks of the importance of the theological interpretation of this phenomena. There is an encounter between the finite and the infinite. There is the understanding of the man such as he is. Man is always the place of encounter between the finite and the infinite. To interpret man only in his finiteness, is to take away something essential from him. But he is in relation with the Infinite, which cannot be reduced or materialized in this world like with Marx. Wojtyla wanted to eliminate the opposition position, which tried to extirpate this desire for the infinite from the heart of man, to make man content with his finitude. St. Augustine said that a man without this desire for the infinite would be one that would be alienated, because he would lose that which is essential for him. This encounter between the finite and the infinite, we know as Christians, happened in the God-man, Christ. Through him, it happens in us.

There is this bond in mystical experience between the finite and the infinite, which is a true experience. It is not just an idea or something of the sort. It is important to understand this point and this experience. Mystical experience is something that needs to be integrated with all other types of experience, although it is different from other types of experience. Henri Bergson examined mystical experience from the point of view of philosophy, as did Jean Galot. To analyze mystical experience means to analyze the interior of man. It's not so much to analyze the relationship of man with God given in creation, but rather in the soul. It is a turn to discover, as St. Augustine says, God living in us.

In this description of mystical experience given by St. John of the Cross and interpreted by Wojtyla, the subjectivity of man in man is not threatened. Man's subjectivity is not dissolved or renounced. The subjectivity is strengthened, not threatened. We can borrow a term from Erich Fromm, that this is humanistic in the deepest core of man.

The double-relation between God and man

There is a double relation between God and man. He says we have an essential, objective, relationship with God from creation. When we speak of creation, we speak of the conservation of creation. It is God who first gives the gift of life, but it is also He who is always present as a creator in his Creation. He is not a god of the rationalists, who created the world leaving it to fortune. He is rather a God who is always present. This union is independent of the consciousness of man. In this way, all beings are in relation with God — including those who don't believe in God. This is an essential union. According to St. John of the Cross, there is a second level of the union with God, the union of likeness, which is given through mystical experience. Through grace, it is given in the conscience of man. St. John of the Cross speaks of the Night of Faith, in which there is a desire of God but at the same time, a lack of consciousness or knowledge of the God we want to know.

Where does this desire come from? There is this desire, but we have to figure where it comes from. It is a gift of God, which man can reject or accept. It pushes us toward this desire. We discover that our nature as it is given to us is not proportioned to a union with God. On the basis of nature, we cannot enter into an encounter with God. This union happens, but it is not appropriate to human nature. It happens through faith, which Wojtyla speaks of as the proportional means of the union of man with God. Through faith, the creature transcends himself and goes toward God himself. This notion of transcendence will become one of the most important concepts for interpreting man as he is. Man can go beyond himself to encounter something, someone, who is not just within me or without me. This dialectic between interiority and exteriority is already present here in this relationship with God of man. Mystical union is an encounter with God, and is therefore something that is not a product of man's thought, but a person who is revealed in a special way in experience.

We can say that here the faith is a reality. We can compare the faith to a light that illuminates the intellect. There is a dialectic between faith and reason in the intellect which *Fides et Ratio* speaks about. There is a certain circle which is not vicious between faith and reason. Faith seeks understanding, but the intellect seeks the faith. This is a paradox, but not too strong, when one understands the terms well. Vatican I defined that man can know God by the force of reason. There was a dogma of the faith that man could know God by reason. There was this circle. The faith illuminates the intellect to know God himself. The participation of man is also present here. Man is not just someone who receives, but someone who is open to this light. The intellect is given a task, not just to know the objects or effects of God, but to know God as a person. The faith has a cognitive dimension, to help us to know the personality and non-objectivity of God. As St. John of the Cross, man becomes God through participation. This is not the type of substantial divinization of heterodox theologies, but rather means that man participates in the knowledge that God has of himself.

In mystical union, man goes beyond the concepts that he has. In these concepts we possess, we have abstracted them from the world that we know. It is not surprising, therefore, that the mystics speak in poetry rather than prose or philosophy, because concepts are not capable of expressing this reality. It's possible to communicate more through metaphors. There is a dialogical reality of man and God. There is an encounter among persons. Man does act here. Wojtyla speaks of the burden and tiresome quality (*fatica*) of participation in God. Man is not just passive, but it is a task of man, maintaining the attitude of openness and detachment from the world. We can see the

humanism of man which Wojtyla speaks about. Maritain spoke of an integral humanism in this case, that is contradistinguished from the lacking forms of humanism. There were different lines of thought identified as humanism that really weren't. On the one hand, we saw a humanism that created man as self-sufficient, and was accomplished only by the refusal of God and man, like Sartre and Hobbes. They believed that man was concentrated on himself in a closed way. Man had projects on the world and objectivizes it, but cannot maintain the look toward another. If the other is God it is insupportable for Sartre, who said that God doesn't just not exist but must not exist, because he would take away our freedom. Man is closed in on himself for this reason. Intersubjectivity became a threat for man in Sartre's idea. The other erroneous humanism was collectivism, like with Marx. Nothing remained the person's. In the last few decades, we saw this type of collectivism resulted in violence. Man cannot renounce everything about his individuality.

In the integral humanism of Wojtyla, he tries to maintain the two poles of the dialectic. Man is an individual and at the same time in relation with others. This relation with others is not accidental, but is essential for man as man. The vision of man that emerges from the theology of St. John of the Cross is that man is built on three levels (although Wojtyla speaks more of the psychosomatic unity of body and soul). Man has a material or bodily level. But there is a psychic level that cannot be reduced to a material level, but that cannot be reduced to a spiritual level, which is a third level. St. John of the Cross describes this very well. The encounter with God doesn't happen at the psychic level but at the spiritual level. All three levels are essential for man. Wojtyla doesn't speak in these terms in his dissertation, but this vision is already present. Man appears to us not as a self-sufficient being, but a person who is realized most profoundly in interpersonal encounter with God and others. There is a reciprocal belonging, which we can see in the family, but which pertains to all of life. He speaks of the *communio personarum* like the *communio* of the Trinitarian. A third point of Wojtyla from St. John of the Cross is that man is a being who cannot be contented with finitude. There is in man a tension toward the infinite. Man looks for this encounter with the infinite.

This likeness and union of the likeness with God brings us to the first words of revelation, in which we learn that man was created in the image and likeness of God. If God is a Trinity of persons, if the life of God is a continuous community and mutual belonging, man, created in the image of this community of persons, hides in himself the mystery of the person. We cannot have any positive knowledge of God, but we learn about God through the *via negativa*. We cannot have any exhaustive knowledge about man, because man is always something more. The mystery of man is inserted within the mystery of God. We can know about man from a material and psychic point of view, but we will not have a knowledge of the highest level of man, the spiritual level of man, very easily. Man and God are alike in being persons. But we have to ask why they are persons. They are persons because they are not objectivizable or reducible to positive statements. We cannot speak of God as an object as in the sense of a thing, or reduce him to a series of provisional emotional states. The highest level of the person happens when there is an emotional nothingness. The spiritual experience is something that touches man's ontological core. This cannot be touched through the emotions. In this way, the anthropology that emerges from the encounter of Wojtyla with St. John of the Cross is a type of negative anthropology, in the sense in which the German Theodore Adorno speaks today. We cannot ever grasp man exhaustively, nor to pretend to have an absolute knowledge of man. But this anthropology we're discussing isn't deprived of content. It's not like we cannot know anything about man, but we cannot know everything of man. We can say absolutely what is contrary to the dignity of man, as traditional moral theology has done. The positive moral norms are not valid *semper et pro semper*, but the negative moral norms are valid *semper et pro semper*, like killing an innocent person. There are certain patterns of conduct that are always harmful for man. Sartre himself had come to the conclusion of the irreducibility of man.

March 3, 2000

Classes 5-6

Encounter with St. Thomas Aquinas

The last time we spoke of the encounter of Wojtyla with the mystical theology of St. John of the Cross. For

Wojtyla, this mystical theology was a personal turn for him, as Frossard writes. It helped him to discover the most personal and intimate Christian experience. He discovered a phenomenon that wasn't completely conscious. Through this his phenomenological sensitivity was developed. Today we will speak of the second encounter which was fundamental for Wojtyla, that with Saint Thomas and Thomism. We'll speak of this encounter in terms of the development of his adequate anthropology.

He met the thought of St. Thomas some months after his discovery with that of St. John of the Cross. He met him in German-occupied Poland in the clandestine seminary of Krakow. As he often said in the book of Frossard, this encounter was for him like a contemporary turn in the realm of concepts. Until this point, his education was humanistic. He didn't have the experience of great philosophical systems like that of St. Thomas. Ontology and Metaphysics by a Polish author was very important. There was a small book that collected the lectures of Fr. Karol Wojtyla to Krakovian students on the meaning of man that was published in Italian a few years ago. Wojtyla also encountered St. Thomas during his studies at the Angelicum, especially through Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, an author of many large books on St. Thomas. Then when he was at Lublin and began to teach about 1954, he encountered the Thomistic school that was called the Lublin school. This Thomism and this philosophical school of Lublin was a special sort of Thomism because it was developed in the contrast of philosophies that were crucial at this time in Poland ideologically. Marxism was very strong in Poland at this time and Lublin was the only place you could get something different.

This Thomism had to be open to modern philosophy and dialogue with it. It also had to have a methodological consciousness that was more manifest than in other authors of the period. This Thomistic school was inspired by existential Thomism. There were some authors of that time who were essentialist Thomists, but Lublin was more existential Thomism, rediscovering St. Thomas through great French philosophers like Maritain and Gilson. They had rediscovered the fundamental intuition of St. Thomas of existence as fundamental for reality. This rediscovery distinguished St. Thomas from Aristotle. Among the Lublin professors, it's interesting to mention the name of Stefan Swiezawski, to whom Maritain dedicated his letter of Philosophy at the moment of the Council. Maritain wrote a letter to this philosopher which was very influential on Wojtyla. We should cite a passage of this letter. Maritain wrote that the tradition of the scholastic manualists transferred the intuition with the dialectic of form. The intellect had not seen in philosophers or their students the intellectual intuition of being. He said philosophy had to begin with the personal philosophical recognition of being. This personal contact was fundamental for Wojtyla. Philosophy was not a chain of philosophical concepts but something coming from lived experience. The philosopher is someone who experiences what is and tries to understand it until the deepest levels. This metaphysical starting point is crucial for classical philosophy as well as for Wojtyla.

Naturally Wojtyla was conscious that there were elements of Thomistic philosophy that were not current. Thomas' philosophy of nature was Aristotelian was no longer sustainable. Wojtyla argued with the ethical framework of St. Thomas as well. But according to Wojtyla, the philosophy of St. Thomas as a whole was noteworthy because it didn't depend on physics but metaphysics. There was not a logical dependence. The constitutive concepts of St. Thomas's philosophy were still current. This metaphysical attitude of the philosophy of St. Thomas was something that Wojtyla shared. This novum of St. Thomas with respect to Aristotle — the discovery of being, the intuition of reality — was found in Wojtyla's discussion with Frossard. It confirmed his intuitions toward reality. Metaphysics was visible within lived experience. The task of the philosopher was to discover that which experience teaches, understand it and teach it. This metaphysical turn is present throughout in the philosophy of Wojtyla. He would always try to go beyond phenomenology, to show the most profound ontic structure that is behind immediate experience. We can say that for Wojtyla like for Thomistic philosophy, the first philosophy is the philosophy of being, of reality as it is given in our experience, but that reality interpreted as it is in Thomism.

There are many characteristic frameworks of modern philosophy as well, like the philosophy of consciousness. We see this in Kant's focus on the reality of the mind. There is also the philosophy of consciousness like that in Husserl. Wojtyla doesn't share Husserl's attitude that we have to stop at this consciousness. We find this in Perché Uomo?, page 68. The aspect of absolute consciousness from Descartes that is found in Husserl's phenomenology, led to the affirmation that being is found in consciousness while the reality of the person is found in the concept of

the conscious being. As we'll see the theme of consciousness in the Acting Person is against this notion of consciousness as constitutive of reality, as in Husserl. Wojtyla tried to demonstrate that consciousness as it is given is not as Husserl imagines it. Wojtyla says that modern philosophy begins from the idea of man as the ultimate reality. The first page of *Love and Responsibility* is very important here. There is a general vision of the whole philosophy of reality, in which he says that the world is composed of objects and subjects, that every object is an object for some subject. Man is the subject. Everything that is an object is an object for man. He then says that *Love and Responsibility* won't begin with the subject, because subjectivism was the summit of modern philosophy. He said man is also an object that is presented at the same time as a subject and object, even within his own consciousness. This object is a subject as well. We will try to develop more these thoughts.

We can say that for Wojtyla we can begin from the person and his experience, but he puts the problem of man in the first place, because when man does philosophy or metaphysics, man seeks a response to the question of who he is. But to respond to this question, man has to place himself in the world. This response is found only in a larger context. This context is the philosophy of being, because man is a being, a being who is altogether special, but a being all the same. This being of man has to be explained within the philosophy of being. This is an attitude that is characteristic for Wojtyla. There is also an anti-subjectivistic attitude that is characteristic of Thomism. We cannot confuse with anti-subjectivism with an anti-subject mentality, because Wojtyla values and treasures the subject. Subjectivism reduces the subject to a construction. Wojtyla is also realistic, focusing on concrete realities like Thomism. Wojtyla focuses on men rather than just the concept of man. Wojtyla doesn't want abstract man, but concrete man, man as he is found in experience. For this reason, he shares to a certain extent the insights of Levinas, who finds in man a value. First philosophy for Wojtyla, however, unlike Levinas is metaphysical and not ethical.

Wojtyla analyzes man like St. Thomas as a substance. He uses the category of suppositum, of potency and act which is fundamental for the understanding of man. He uses the category of the person as well. But Wojtyla in a certain sense enriches these Thomistic understandings, because this category in the Thomistic philosophy were the characteristics that were common to the whole world. The categories of act and potency, substance, etc. can be used with respect to the whole world. Through the discovery of human subjectivity, Thomism can be enriched according to Wojtyla. The realistic genius of St. Thomas allows us to form the fundamental concepts of interpreting and thinking of man as a person, of his actions with others and with God. All these categories are indispensable. But having taken Aristotle and his metaphysics as a privileged interlocutor, St. Thomas looked at them objectively, without focusing so much on the subjectivity of the person. The concept of act and potency are valid for all beings who have a certain potency and can be realized in placing acts — this is fundamental for the dynamic of reality — but in man there is a significance of this passage from potency to act for Wojtyla.

We can see how these concepts are realized in our experience. These are not just metaphysical concepts to be looked at from the outside, but we need to look at them through the interiority of our experience. They have to be developed. It is not by chance that when St. Thomas speaks of the person, he speaks of him as he is found in the treatise on the Trinity. When he writes the treatise on man in the *secunda pars*, he does not use the person there, but treats him as a rational animal and social animal. That which is lacking is to describe the dynamic of the person. We can say that St. Thomas furnishes an objective personalism. But he lacks the subjective angle, beginning from human experience, as Wojtyla writes in his article on Thomistic personalism which has been published in Italian. One can observe that when the conception of person in St. Thomas is objective, it is not opposed to the concept of consciousness and self-consciousness. Wojtyla says that St. Thomas explains to us the faculty through which consciousness and self-consciousness can be developed. Practically-speaking, he stops here. St. Thomas saw the person in his existential reality, but it is reality to discover the experiences lived by the person. St. Thomas tells us that man is a person (and gives us the intuition of the person). Wojtyla shows us how man is a person, how man lives within in his interiority of the person.

Wojtyla also shares St. Thomas's epistemological system, particularly his confidence before experience and reason. In Thomistic philosophy, there is an appreciation for pre-philosophical thought that we can call common sense. This is prescientific experience, which is the experience of our life. It should not be rejected by Kant and others,

who treated it as something that deceives us or something that should be lessened. Wojtyla tries to preserve the fullness of this experience. One of the greatest difficulties in appreciating the philosophy of St. Thomas today is the proper understanding of the term experience. After the modern scientific method of observations, this word experience has been identified with experience that is the base of science. Experience for moderns is the product of abstractions that have objectified only one aspect of experience, abstracting it from immanent experience like affectivity. In this way, the word experience became coextensive with sensation, something identifiable only in the sense. Experience coincided with objectifiable facts. We are not, however, subjects who do pure science in daily life, but we experience the world from something other than scientific standards, but from the needs of the person. When Wojtyla discovers the philosophy of Scheler, he will find there a rich experience of this affective side of experience that many times is hidden when experience is identified only with its objectifiable perspective.

From the epistemological point of view, one has to keep present experience as a whole. Naturally Wojtyla shares with St. Thomas his epistemological realism. He tries to understand man as a concrete reality. The act of consciousness doesn't consist in the constitution of the subject, as it is in Husserl, but in the penetration in the object himself in whom sense and reason operate. Wojtyla doesn't accept this strict separation between sense and reason. Experience is an understanding in which the intellect plays a very important role, but the intellect is led by the object. He is against rationalism of the 17th century. We see this rejection in *Fides et Ratio*, where John Paul II speaks of the courage of the truth, because the purpose of consciousness is the truth. He experiences reality as it exists. Man is made for the truth and cannot exist without the truth. This moment of the truth is crucial for his conception of freedom. This element comes from his encounter with Thomism. Truth here is not in the first place an attribute of an act of consciousness, but rather the attribute of reality itself. Truth in the first place is in the reality itself which is revealed before my intellect. The first meaning of reality, we can say, is that reality is a manifestation of being. There is some affinity here with the thought of Heidegger, who interpreted the Greek word *aletheia* as a not-hiding of reality. He did an etymological analysis that can be contested, but there is a philosophical reality here. Truth is not something that man through the act of consciousness constitutes, but is something that is found in reality itself. We have to be guided by consciousness. This is the core of the phenomenological method that Wojtyla will follow. Naturally for both St. Thomas and Wojtyla the truth is the adequation between reality and the mind, but this is the second moment.

In the philosophy of Wojtyla, truth takes the spot of supreme value, as it does in his ethics. He speaks of the truth about the good. We can speak of the true good and can speak of other values as true goods. The truth is the first value of our consciousness. We have to place all other values subordinate to it. This is the attitude of St. Thomas's epistemology as well, that the order of knowledge has to come after the order of truth. In the practical order of our practice, the first value is good, but under this is the value of truth. There is a strict connection between the practical order and the order of truth.

In parentheses, we can add something that another teacher at Lublin made. There are some transcendentals that are good, true and beautiful, but the question is whether these three transcendentals are attributes of being but do they tell us something about the relationship between being and the person. Merecki says it's the latter, because the good shows us someone. When we speak of the subjective and personal act, we have to say that it is already present in St. Thomas's philosophy although not developed. The three transcendentals for St. Thomas are personal values for St. Thomas.

The last tract of this attitude that Wojtyla shares with St. Thomas developed in Lublin is methodological. On the one hand, he shares the methodology of the dialogue with history. This attitude Wojtyla shares with St. Thomas but perhaps not with all Thomists. He focuses on systems. We see this in *Fides et Ratio* on the primacy of philosophical thinking on systems, to find the seeds of the truth in all systems. There can be no room for philosophical pride. The attitude of Wojtyla would be typically Catholic, the philosophy of et...et.

FR 4. Nonetheless, it is true that a single term conceals a variety of meanings. Hence the need for a preliminary clarification. Driven by the desire to discover the ultimate truth of existence, human beings seek to acquire those universal elements of knowledge which enable them to understand themselves better and to advance in

their own self-realization. These fundamental elements of knowledge spring from the *wonder* awakened in them by the contemplation of creation: human beings are astonished to discover themselves as part of the world, in a relationship with others like them, all sharing a common destiny. Here begins, then, the journey which will lead them to discover ever new frontiers of knowledge. Without wonder, men and women would lapse into deadening routine and little by little would become incapable of a life which is genuinely personal. Through philosophy's work, the ability to speculate which is proper to the human intellect produces a rigorous mode of thought; and then in turn, through the logical coherence of the affirmations made and the organic unity of their content, it produces a systematic body of knowledge. In different cultural contexts and at different times, this process has yielded results which have produced genuine systems of thought. Yet often enough in history this has brought with it the temptation to identify one single stream with the whole of philosophy. In such cases, we are clearly dealing with a "philosophical pride" which seeks to present its own partial and imperfect view as the complete reading of all reality. In effect, every philosophical *system*, while it should always be respected in its wholeness, without any instrumentalization, must still recognize the primacy of philosophical *inquiry*, from which it stems and which it ought loyally to serve. Although times change and knowledge increases, it is possible to discern a core of philosophical insight within the history of thought as a whole. Consider, for example, the principles of non-contradiction, finality and causality, as well as the concept of the person as a free and intelligent subject, with the capacity to know God, truth and goodness. Consider as well certain fundamental moral norms which are shared by all. These are among the indications that, beyond different schools of thought, there exists a body of knowledge which may be judged a kind of spiritual heritage of humanity. It is as if we had come upon an *implicit philosophy*, as a result of which all feel that they possess these principles, albeit in a general and unreflective way. Precisely because it is shared in some measure by all, this knowledge should serve as a kind of reference-point for the different philosophical schools. Once reason successfully intuits and formulates the first universal principles of being and correctly draws from them conclusions which are coherent both logically and ethically, then it may be called right reason or, as the ancients called it, *orth(o)-logos, recta ratio*.

There is a cooperation between faith and reason, which Wojtyla shares with St. Thomas.

Vision of Man in Wojtyla and St. Thomas

We turn to the vision of man in Wojtyla and St. Thomas. There are some interpreters of Wojtyla who have seen an Augustinian trend in Wojtyla's thought, but they don't speak of an opposition between Augustine and St. Thomas in the thought of Wojtyla. They weren't really all that opposed. There was an integration of their insights in Wojtyla's thought. As we've said above, the concept of person is something that Wojtyla shares with St. Thomas. This concept is taken from Boethius. We can cite a small section of *The Acting Person*, in which Wojtyla says that the attitude of St. Thomas speaks of the act he presupposes the person. Wojtyla intends to turn this perspective around, not speaking of the act presupposing the person, but to focus the act as revelatory of the person. Wojtyla wants to demonstrate the person through the actions he carries out. This will reveal how the man is a person.

But Wojtyla shares the concept of person with St. Thomas, who we know took his concept from Boethius' definition of the person as an individual substance of rational nature. This conception of the person is very important in the discussion with Max Scheler. What does this definition of the person say? We can say first that this conception of the person denies that man is a succession of thoughts, deprived of coherence and stability. Many times today this conception is affirmed as a succession of conscious thoughts. Scheler thought of the person only as a center of acts. Wojtyla spoke of the distinction between the ontic subjectivity of the person (that man cannot be reduced to self-consciousness) and his experienced, personal subjectivity. When we reduce the person to a state of consciousness, we can find a contradiction because the person would change when his self-consciousness of something changed. This has consequences for familial relations, for example, because one can change his mind on the commitment of marriage. This is important for the discussion on the status of the human embryo. When we identify the person with his state of consciousness, it is difficult to say that the embryo is a person. Wojtyla denies this conception of the person as identifiable with states of consciousness. This distinction between the ontic subjectivity and experience subjectivity is very important.

Wojtyla in *Perché Uomo?* writes on p. 69 that the person is not an autonomous subject. Consciousness interiorizes everything man knows, even about himself. The distinction between consciousness and self-consciousness is important, but man is more than either. There is a phenomenological idea of man, but man is not identifiable with his consciousness. This distinction is always present in Wojtyla, particularly when he underlines authentic subjectivity. To signify man's rational nature includes self-consciousness, although it is not developed in St. Thomas. Wojtyla also speaks of the unity of soul and body in the person, the psychosomatic unity of man. Wojtyla tries to show that this unity is existential, how the spirit (soul) is experienced in reality. It is not immediate to experience, but when we analyze our experience, we can go beyond the threshold of experience and intuit it through analysis of all that is given to us. He tries to show the soul in human experience, as he did in the Catecheses on Human Love. The body is a sign of the person.

We come now to the problem of intersubjectivity in the thought of St. Thomas. Man is, according to Aristotle, a social animal. Man is a social animal in a special way. St. Thomas begins from nature. Wojtyla shares the fact that man is a social animal, but begins from the person as a subject rather than nature. He has a different starting point and argues toward man's intersubjectivity. This intersubjectivity is found in St. Thomas's thought in his treatise on the Trinity. Wojtyla, like St. Thomas, treats man as a moral subject, which reveals man in a more adequate way. Even here, while using St. Thomas's concepts of virtues and acts, Wojtyla tries to demonstrate how man lives his reality. He doesn't identify himself with the moral thought of St. Thomas, because when we look at the Summa of St. Thomas, St. Thomas begins from the analysis of the ultimate end of man, beatitude, how we can obtain it. Wojtyla begins with experience that is immediately given in morality. We find a more Kantian orientation in Wojtyla here, as we'll take up in the next lecture. He finds the experience of moral duty, which is given in immediate experience. When I have a moral problem, we don't think of our relationship with our ultimate end, but with the thing that is more immediate. This will be an important point in the transition to the thought of Max Scheler on the experience of morality.

March 10, 2000
Classes 7-8

Scheler

In our last two meetings, we have been speaking of the encounter of Karol Wojtyla with the thinkers that have influenced his philosophy and theology. We spoke first of St. John of the Cross and his mystical theology. Last time we focused on St. Thomas and his philosophical system. At the end of last time, we spoke of the interpretation of moral experience that is characteristic for St. Thomas and for Thomism in general, which is above all a metaphysical interpretation. On the experiential side, there is something true in this approach, but there's something undeveloped as well. To look at the human act from the perspective of act and potency has some validity, but there is not a real focus on the subject, on how the person experiences this act. The Summa begins with the category of the ultimate end and tries to individuate what means lead us toward this ultimate end. All of morality is located in this framework between the ultimate end and the desire for beatitude in man.

Perhaps there could be some doubt if moral experience as it is given is grasped in a full enough sense. In Etienne Gilson's Thomism, in the last section he speaks on ethics, moral actions and ethics, he says that in friendship our friends our occasions for us to exercise our moral virtues. Others are good for us to act morally. Today, when we focus on Scheler, we'll see that his thesis is exactly opposed to this. Wojtyla tries to find something in the middle. Today we'll speak of his encounter with phenomenology, which is an encounter with Max Scheler, a German phenomenologist and one of the greatest proponents of this philosophical methods. He has precisely analyzed moral experience from the phenomenological point of view. Scheler for Wojtyla is a great moral philosopher.

When we discussed Wojtyla's contact with the mystical theology of St. John of the Cross, there were already the seeds of the phenomenological approach. St. John of the Cross preserved the subjective part of the act and Wojtyla wanted to preserve it in his approach, rather than use the more objective Thomistic approach. The first introduction

of Wojtyła to phenomenology was his experience as an actor in the Rhapsodic Theater of Miroslav Kotlarczyk. His theater had a specific philosophy of the theater. It was a question to look not just at external causes of events, but at what comes from the interior of man, at his conscience, at his inner motivations. These same points are found in Wojtyła's plays. The actor, the protagonist, is the most important setting. Rainer Maria Rilke said that in this type of theater, it's not a question of the spectators and what they observe in the external drama, but that they can see the world with different eyes. In their world of perceiving, they will have been changed after having seen a particular play. There was a liturgical sense of theater in the Polish mind as well. The theater department of Lublin is called Mute Theater, but it is based on this idea of the Rhapsodic Theater and what is deepest in man.

This way of living the most important events of life was present in Wojtyła, who acted before and during the war. Kotlarczyk had come to Krakow as well after leaving Wadowice. When we read Wojtyła's dramas, like the Jeweler's Shop, we see this conception of the theater in a very clear way. This sense of the encounter with phenomenology began with Rhapsodic theater and with John of the Cross.

The character of his encounter with Scheler was different from that with St. John of the Cross and with St. Thomas. Wojtyła was substantially in accord with their visions of reality. With Scheler, Wojtyła disputed. He didn't accept the pillars of his philosophical vision. But at the same time, as we'll see when we read *Person and Act*, he accepted Scheler's phenomenological method, but trying to use it in a more consistent way than even Scheler himself used it. To what remained veiled in Scheler, Wojtyła wants to uncover. He thought Scheler was enslaved by some of the philosophical and contextual presuppositions of his time. When Wojtyła criticizes Scheler, he does so on the basis of experience, that experience itself does not confirm some of the affirmations of Scheler. Wojtyła dedicated his post-doctoral (habilitation) dissertation to phenomenology of Scheler, which was entitled. *An Evaluation of the Possibility to build a Christian ethics on the basis of the system of Max Scheler*. This was published in Italian with the title *Max Scheler*.

We can ask why Scheler was important for Wojtyła and why he chose him. The Thomism that dominated Poland's philosophical establishment at this time, had a speculative and systematic framework, a little detached from concrete ethical experience. When John Paul II remembered how he began to write his first original ethical work, *Love and Responsibility*, he said that it came from his pastoral experience with young people. He wanted to show that Christian moral experience isn't a ton of rules they have to accept, but that Christian ethics arises from and is rooted in the experience of man as a whole. This is found in St. Thomas's ethics, but there wasn't a framework to make it seen so easily. This attempt was already begun in the West with Jacques Maritain's *Moral Philosophy*, which is an examination of various systems. He shows the necessity to begin from moral experience and moral intuition. We can also mention the name of some phenomenologists who were connected with Catholicism in this era, like Dietrich von Hildebrand and Edith Stein, who began from the perspective of phenomenology.

Wojtyła demonstrated how the bond with God is the foundation of an integral humanism in his work on St. John of the Cross. But at the time, he didn't do the analysis of the bond with values and other experiences of the human person. When Wojtyła began to work as a priest, he began to see how common philosophy focuses on human experience. He gave a personalistic interpretation to the natural law, which cannot be understood only as a law that is a little analogous to the law on non-living nature, but rather is the law of personal nature. This he tried to demonstrate. There was also some influence on Wojtyła from Roman Ingarden and Edmund Husserl — who introduced phenomenology into Polish culture. Ingarden was persecuted by the Marxists and was prevented from teaching in Polish universities. Ingarden's work on *Responsibility* evinced a method that was similar to that employed by Wojtyła in *Love and Responsibility*. The way of proceeding was something they clearly shared.

It would be important to focus a little on the current of phenomenology in philosophy. Wojtyła's most original philosophical attempt was to synthesize Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics and phenomenology. The father of phenomenology was the Austrian Jewish philosopher Edmund Husserl, who at the end of the 19th century, had done two things. He took philosophy to the subject. The philosophy of logic was very popular prior to Husserl, with logic's being understood as the rules governing human thought. Husserl started from this logical subjectivism in order to demonstrate that it is not possible to sustain subjectivism in ethics. There was an objective turn toward

St. Thomas and to other thinkers. The movement was to return to the things themselves. Phenomenon is that which is present in Greek. We have to understand that in these years, philosophy was dominated by a subjectivism but also by a certain historicism. Raisa Maritain (Jacques' wife) was at the University of Paris during these years and wrote that the philosophy regnant at the time had many merits, with a high understanding and appreciation of science, but focused too much on the historical events, without focusing on the subject himself. Their inclinations were to history or to mathematics and they had a positivistic notion of knowledge formed from idealistic and rationalistic principles. It ended up in an empiricism and historicism that was inefficacious and rigid. When we read the memories of the first students of Husserl, we find an enthusiasm because he wanted to go to the things themselves rather than focus on what other philosophers said. This movement had a great deal of success during these years, against German idealism, of Kant or of Hegel. When we read Hegel, the enormous speculative slant of his philosophy cannot be missed. We find connections between him and lived experience in his work, but it's not easy to find them.

The method of Husserl was to make a triple reduction:

- 1) An historical reduction, suspending our historical thought to focus on how reality is given to us. He believed that it was possible to find a method that would do this.
- 2) An essentialist reduction, moving from the accidents to arrive at the essence of the phenomenon.
- 3) An transcendental reduction, which was the most controversial and one that was not held by Wojtyla. Husserl wanted to suspend our memory and confidence in the experience and existence of the phenomenon to evaluate only the effects on our consciousness. The object was reduced to the content of consciousness. In the part that Wojtyla dedicates to consciousness in the Acting Person, he says that the object of phenomenology cannot be reduced to this consciousness.

The cognitive focus on essence was the major point of Husserl. One of his students, Scheler, applied this phenomenological method to ethics, focusing on value. Von Hildebrand applied phenomenology to ethics very well.

Between Wojtyla and Scheler there are some clear points of contact.

- 1) Wojtyla found in him a certain ally. Scheler's most important work was Formalism in the Ethics of Material and Value. In this book, we find a discussion with the ethics of Kant, which is formalistic, prescinding from matter and empiricism. The whole content of ethics came from the reason. Scheler tried to show that there was a material ethics of values found in experience. This was in direct opposition to Kant. He focused on the concept of intentionality, which came from the Austrian Brentano, who said that ethics couldn't be reduced to its formal object, because the distinctive trait of human moral experience was intentionality, the directing of oneself toward an object, toward something. In this sense, Scheler was an ally for Wojtyla, because Wojtyla wanted to demonstrate how man lives values. The method of Scheler is very important for this reason.
- 2) Another point of contact between Wojtyla and Scheler is on what Scheler calls the path of the sequela in the finding of moral values. There was a need for a moral model or guide. Morality is learned, he said, through an encounter with a Master. This was very important and appealing to Christians. This was clearly a point of contact between the two.
- 3) What they also shared in contact was that the person was the place of moral experience, the place where the values were found. For Wojtyla, the person was the principle focus. The way in which they conceived the person differed between the two, but the importance of the person was shared by both. Both also valued the other as other, and not just an object in my world. Scheler wrote a work on the Essence and Form of Sympathy which is important here. Edith Stein wrote a work on the Problem of Intuition where Stein focused on the other not from exterior analogy to the Ego, but rather on the interiority of the other to

perceive the person as a subject, as a person, rather than a subject. To show this possibility to understand the other as an other was very important in Wojtyla.

There were also critical affirmations in the dissertation of Wojtyla on Scheler. Scheler's system is not fitting for Christian ethics according to Wojtyla, unless there were several corrections. The method nevertheless was useful. According to Wojtyla, Scheler did not exhaust the whole potential of ethical experience. Some other aspects of human experience were accessible to phenomenological discussion. These are things that are not given immediately in experience but are part of experience. This came from his study of St. Thomas and his metaphysics. Wojtyla criticized Scheler's metaphysical, epistemological and anthropological foundations.

All ethical experience in Scheler is reduced to emotive experience. Wojtyla speaks of the emotivism of Scheler. He also criticized his tendency toward subjectivism. Scheler shared with Kant his notion of the reason, which he said was empirical. But he said that values didn't come from experience but apriori. For Kant ethical experience was formal, the obedience to the categorical imperative found in reason. Scheler wanted to show that there is an empirical foundation, while maintaining the Kantian conception of reason. Values for Scheler were perceived only through our emotions. Their whole hierarchy was given in emotional experience. There were two principal emotions in moral experience (found in Brentano), love and hatred. What is lacking here is an element of rational judgment. The reason in this Kantian empiricism looks for values, which are given from emotional experience.

But is the value that I perceive in the most intense way the one I should follow? This is a way to perceive the authenticity of the experience. When we look at authenticity in Sartre, we see the authentic man follows the values he experiences in the most intense way. It is not someone who sticks with his wife even though he's no longer in love, but rather one who goes after another woman to whom he is now attracted. The system of moral duty is not present, because in Scheler's polemics with Kant, he tried to exclude all together the normative aspect of ethics. In trying to affirm the experiential aspect of morality, he lost the aspect of normativity in Kant. Wojtyla will focus on moral conscience in his dissertation. Moral consciousness is not just the place where we perceive moral value, but also the place where we perceive what value I should follow. He said Scheler never focused on this normative aspect of moral value. Scheler reduces the experience of values to their emotional perception.

For Scheler, moral value is recognized always on the shoulders of other values. Moral value cannot be the object of intention, but rather is realized always when we realize other values. To think that moral values are the object of intention is a type of philosophical Pharisaicalism. Wojtyla says that it is difficult not to say that Scheler forgot the person and his essential moment of moral experience, of the subject with the object and with the value. These are personal values. What is lacking in Scheler is the personalization of the values perceived. According to Scheler, moral judgment comes through the act, but not through the person himself. An act is good when it conforms to a moral value, either high or low. This moral value is moralized on the shoulders of other values. If we were interested in our moral perfection, we'd be new Pharisees and moral value would be destroyed. Wojtyla doesn't share this idea.

Wojtyla's criticism of Scheler

What Scheler's system lacks is an adequate analysis of man as a subject and author of action. He is not just the place where values are present, but he judges rationally and does and authors actions. For Scheler, the person is not a substance as he was for St. Thomas. There was not a stability of the person. But Scheler thought the persons was the Act-center, the center of actions. The person lacks ontological consistency. The person cannot become good or evil, because there is no ontological substratum that can be modified. St. Thomas said the person is a substance where the primacy is given to the rational aspect. Thanks to this dimension, man can judge in a rational way all that which we experiences. For Scheler, man is *res amans*, something that goes toward values. He is not really *res volens*. There is a certain overlap with David Hume, who said that the reason is always the slave of emotions. Wojtyla compares Hume, Scheler and Kant in an article, and says that in Hume and Scheler, he said that reason was instrumental. In Hume, we cannot perceive reality as objective, "We never pass one step beyond ourselves." All of the perception of reality, including moral reality, is enclosed within the subject.

Wojtyla shares Scheler's personalism that the person is the highest value. We can also find this in Kant's second formulation of the categorical imperative, to treat the other always as an end and never as a means. This is personalistic as well. In Scheler, there is also a lack of the profundity of the person which is in Kant, when Kant says there is a noumenal reality in man who cannot be reduced to phenomenon. There is something under everything that is observable and given in Kant, just like in St. John of the Cross. This is not found in Scheler.

In Wojtyla, we will see that he will attempt to demonstrate that man can achieve his moral perfection, which is not possible in Scheler. Wojtyla distinguishes between the desire to be good and the desire to experience myself as good. Scheler would be able to criticize the latter attitude as a new type of Pharisaicalism for Wojtyla. François Mauriac had written a book on the Pharisee featuring the same criticism. But the desire to be good is something completely different and Wojtyla stresses this. I am someone who is responsible for myself, someone entrusted to myself. My realization is my moral duty. But the person realizes himself as a man in the moral dimension. I am responsible for my moral quality. One cannot exclude this moral dimension of man. For this reason, the desire to be good has nothing to do with Pharisaicalism. This can be shown in the experience of moral conscience for Wojtyla. Scheler didn't have a difference between these two ideas in Scheler.

Wojtyla disagreed with Scheler on what constitutes the moral act. For Scheler it was an act of the emotions that drives the will. For Wojtyla, the moral act is an act of the will. The material of this act can be furnished by the emotions, but the emotions are not the essence of the moral act, but rather the rational aspect is. He said Scheler didn't note the most fundamental and elemental aspect of the moral act. The efficient cause of moral action is the person who acts. An act is not morally good because it is done by the person in conformity with a value, but moral value comes from the necessary condition of doing it for the value. This is the difference between the ontological and axiological value of morality. It must be more than the act of the person. The morally good act requires something more.

This is the core of the polemic of Wojtyla with Scheler. If emotional perfection is that which stimulates the person, this has to be placed under a judgment that clarifies and identifies the truth. The emotionalistic perceptions of Scheler (reducing moral perceptions to the emotions) misses altogether the essence of morality, which is found in moral conscience and in normative behavior. In the *Acting Person*, Wojtyla will speak of the normative power of the truth. This normative power of the truth is shown in moral conscience. Moral consciousness does this translation from that which is and what I have to do. In philosophy, there has been a long debate between "is" and "ought," beginning in Hume's *Treatise on Human Nature*. He noted that all metaphysical systems of morality, there is an unjustifiable passage from what is to what ought. From the logical point of view, Hume said that there is something in the conclusion not present in the premises, because there is something normative in the conclusion that is not present in any of the premises. Wojtyla was conscious of this problem, but he solved it by saying that moral conscience makes this passage, from what is to what I have to do.

Scheler tried to undervalue the value of moral duty in his argument with Kant. Duty is an element of necessity for Kant. Scheler said this was too impersonal, too blind. The question always arises, "why do I have to do it?" Kant says it has to be done because it has to be done. It is not clear what I have to do in many moral circumstances. There can be conflicts of values — and how these are adjudicated is a massive gap in Scheler, because then the most perceived value would triumph. But we might not experience the more important thing in the strongest way. In *Love and Responsibility*, Wojtyla says that the essence of morality is shown most conspicuously at the moment of moral duty. Our trust is rational and is based on the truth. This climate of internal duty always remains. The emotional way of conceptualizing the experience of values in Scheler can be seen in Scheler's interpretation of love and the sequela between the religious and the ethical act.

We continue with our discussion of Wojtyla. Last time we discussed the phenomenology of Scheler and how Wojtyla accepted some things from Scheler's framework, but also how he criticized the defects of Scheler's system. One major criticism was that it lacked an ontological foundation. This was the essential point of the personalistic philosophy Wojtyla later developed in the *Acting Person*. We begin today by concluding our analysis of Wojtyla's encounter with the thought of Scheler and will give an introduction to the method of *Person and Act*.

We saw last week that Wojtyla criticized Scheler for lacking a metaphysical depth with the respect to the person. Scheler does not treat man as a subject of his actions or an actor but only as an act-center, where values are perceived. All that which regards the ethical life of the person for Scheler happens at the emotional level. Scheler has emotionalized the ethical act forgetting that which was forgotten in Kant but also that was accessible to the phenomenological analysis, of the operativity of the person at the moment of action. He also criticized the notion of the experience of love in Scheler. Scheler had analyzed love in the *Essence of Sympathy*, and showed that love couldn't be understood only by beginning from the instinctive part of man (as Freud had), but he mentioned that love was an emotional open to values and something spontaneous in man. Therefore it couldn't be something restricted by precepts. This would be a contradiction for him. Love is something that is given or is not given in a situation, but this is something that happens in a man and cannot be the object of a commandment.

Wojtyla sees things in a different light. For him, love cannot be understood only as an emotional or spontaneous experience. We see his thought in his work *Love and Responsibility* published in 1960. Wojtyla analyzes the experience of love where he distinguishes between the experience of love and falling in love in the psychological sense from love in the ethical sense. Love in the ethical sense is a decision of the person. This is possible because man is an efficient cause of his acts and not just a center of value-perception. Love finds in falling-in-love its preliminary condition. It doesn't consist in simply falling in love. The reason and the will are involved with what the sentiment proposes to us. The task is not toward the emotional or sexual values of the other, but of the ontological value of the other, the dignity of the person, which is not always seen in the emotional appreciation of the other. Sexual and emotional values are taken and enjoyed as goods that help us generally to appreciate the person of the other, but the appreciation of the value of the person of the other is deeper and obviously much more important. There's a distinction that for Wojtyla is very important that he makes in the *Acting Person* how man lives the values that are presented to him but that he cannot be reduced to the emotional experience of values, because man is something more.

The concept of sequela in Scheler Wojtyla criticized as ambiguous because it lacks the element of rational judgment on all that is presented to us in the person of a master. There has to be an immanent value to the relationship with the Master, but the subject may perceive values differently than the Master gives it off. St. Augustine talked about an interior master, not just an exterior master. The interior master is the truth itself that speaks in the heart and conscience of man. Man is something more than the impression that the master makes on him. In Scheler, all experience is defined only in emotional terms. There is the lack of a rational judgment. What fascinates me in the master for Scheler is what completes me as a person. But rational judgment is crucial for a person. In the notion of Christian sequela, we have the necessary involvement of the judgment. St. John of the Cross talks about the (tiring) task [fatica] of following. In the *Acting Person* we'll see how Wojtyla distinguishes between the two functions of conscience. One will be the function of interiorization and then judgment. There has to be a moment of the personalization of that which is proposed to us, even from a Master. In the Christian sense, it is not sufficient to follow the Master only in an exterior way, but there has to be the work of personalization.

The notion of the sacred is different between Scheler and Wojtyla. Religion and ethics are different for Scheler. Ethics isn't a way to achieve sanctity or beatitude. This would mean an instrumentalization of morality, whereas it's supposed to be an original experience. The moral act has nothing to do with punishment or recompense. It is an original act with its punishment or reward built in. Scheler describes this experience as an enriching of life or a diminishment of life. For him, there was no connection at all between the religious and the ethical act. For Wojtyla, on the other hand, they were intimately connected. The religious act, which refers to the person of God, is inherently ethical. Reward is not the primary motive of religious action. We love God and this is the principal

meaning of the religious act. Our love is in a certain sense owed, but it arises within the person. Love for God in Christianity is not basically self-interested according to Wojtyla — to love him because it's in our best interest. Sometimes this idea has popped up in some Thomistic disciples. In Maritain's *Philosophy and Morality*, he criticized the impressions of supernatural utilitarianism in some Christian moral teaching. The true structure of Christian ethics is not like this. Happiness is a gift of grace which is given to us by God as something that is superabundant. In *The Acting Person* we'll see how Wojtyla realizes the pursuit of self-realization in man. Happiness is something that is accidental to the moral act. It's not necessarily intended but it realized. Man is given to himself as the first object of responsibility.

The conclusive two theses of the analysis of Wojtyla on Scheler's philosophy were:

- 1) Scheler's system is incapable of being the basis for the construction of a Christian ethics. For the reasons we've mentioned, it cannot serve as a broad enough foundation. But this is not because of the phenomenological method itself, but the way that Scheler implemented it. Scheler had canceled the normative character of ethical acts as well as the operative aspect of the human person. Conscience should be an analysis of phenomenological analysis. Scheler's exclusion of this came from his emotionalist premises to the use of the method. Phenomenology can still be used as a method for analysis.
- 2) Wojtyla accepts phenomenology as a method as a help for a Christian ethical structure. Phenomenology is welcomed as a method of survey of ethical facts. Naturally, it is limited, but helpful. The foundation of ethics and anthropology needs a metaphysical basis. Phenomenology only analyzes what is analyzed immediately, but cannot get to what's behind it. Metaphysical concepts aren't immediately accessible and hence we need to have a metaphysics standing behind the phenomenology. There has to be an explanation for what is given to us in reality by the phenomenological method. This points to a metaphysics. We have to go toward what is behind what we see that we don't see immediately, like, for example, substance, which we don't immediately perceive but which allows us to understand what we perceive.

Beginning from the phenomenology of the person, we are also led to a need for metaphysics. But it is also helpful, Wojtyla says, to make man the starting point of philosophical inquiry, as Augustine, Pascal and modern philosophies have done. Wojtyla insists that it has to come from taking man as he is, as a real subject, rather than from the pre-philosophical ideas of modern philosophers. To construct a Christian ethics, moreover, we cannot begin from just any experience, but from Christian experience. Christian ethics, as an elaboration of Christian experience, has to reflect on Christian moral acts in a scientific way. Christian ethical experience is the experience of man and says something about man. It can greatly help clarify man. When we analyze the mystical experience of St. John of the Cross, we can also discover what is true about man. It's not just a regional knowledge of Christians, but helps us to understand something that is valid for every man. This was what Wojtyla tried to do in *The Acting Person*.

Introduction to the Acting Person

The Acting Person was the expression of the mature thought of Wojtyla. It was published in Poland in 1969, which is an important fact, because in some way it was a reflection of Wojtyla of his experience at Vatican II. *The Acting Person* has to be understood this. He wrote parts of it during the sessions of the Council. Almost all of the interventions of Wojtyla during the Council centered on man and humanism. In the 1960s, he said the principal questions were about man. Wojtyla was one of the protagonists of the documents of the Council on religious liberty and the constitution of *Gaudium et Spes*. Wojtyla underlines the importance of rethinking our conception of man. In a certain sense, his was a reflection on the freedom of conscience enunciated during the Council. There was in Communism an idea that there was no right to the pursuit of Truth. In *Dignitatis Humanae*, it was stated that the truth is what counts most, but it has to be accepted in force of its own truth, within freedom. The Council proposes to bind the truths of freedom and truth, that man realizes himself through the truth chosen in a free way. This choice of the truth is not something that is extraneous or imposed from the outside by an institution like the Church, but there is a dynamic in man toward the truth. The truth is achieved through the choice of it.

We have to read *The Acting Person* as the attempt to show how this process of the realization of man happens through the free choice of truth. Man has to be analyzed not just from the ontic perspective but from the dynamic perspective. *The Acting Person* as a title expresses this. Man creates himself through his actions. I am the first subject of my responsibility. Only in confrontation with myself, I have this responsibility to realize the highest values of the person. Kenneth Schmitz's book has a title that focuses appropriately on the Drama of the Person, *At the Center of the Human Drama*. While an actor, Wojtyla experienced this dramatic aspect of human experience. His philosophy of man has to be conceived in this way. It is an experience that is very deep. It's not necessarily the only starting point for analyzing man, but for Wojtyla it is the privileged starting point — the dynamism of man — because man is revealed best in what is most properly human. For an adequate anthropology, it's best to begin from what is most human about him, his dynamism. We see this in the pontificate of Wojtyla and in his anthropocentrism. The roots of this papal anthropocentrism which is seen in *Redemptor Hominis* is centered in these thoughts. When he says in *Redemptor Hominis* that man is the first way of the Church, this anthropocentrism comes from the anthropocentrism of God who made man the center of Creation and the God-man the center of redemption.

The method of Wojtyla is a method that is close to that of Socrates. It's in accord with the vocation of a Church. Socrates defines the philosopher's task as that of a midwife. In Wojtyla, even if the book is not all too easy to read, reading it is important not because it treats knowledge for knowledge's sake, but because it focuses on human action and proposes it to us to try to evaluate whether it is true. There is a strict relation between anthropology and ethics. In a certain sense, some systems use anthropology for ethics. But ethics and anthropology are intertwined because ethical action helps man become himself and more. Styczen defines ethics as normative anthropology. Ethics and anthropology are always contemporary. Ethics cannot be excluded from a treatise on man. As Wojtyla says, ethics has to be taken from outside of parentheses. There is more than the objective nature of morality in *The Acting Person*, but on the subjective dimension of morality, how man lives and experiences it, how it's born within him. This problem was very important for contemporary moral theology, given that not everything that was coming out at the time was good. There has been a crisis going on, focused upon by *Veritatis Splendor*, between ethics and truth, between freedom and the truth. Wojtyla started on a street that focused on the subject in morality. This problem is treated in *The Acting Person* with a great importance for moral theology.

Method of Wojtyla

The method Wojtyla uses is phenomenological, to focus on man's experience. This method was not presented in their final form. Rather it was a method of getting closer to the reality of man, of approximation. This was the method of Gabriel Marcel, *l'approchement*. Wojtyla proceeded with great caution, constantly returning to the same thing, as if he wanted to show the different aspects of the phenomenon, without losing anything important of the thing he was analyzing. He came back from several angles. He was looking more and more for the best language possible. One can see the progress of his thought in this book as a work in progress.

In the use of the phenomenological method, Wojtyla speaks of two processes. They were constantly being used in the book and are important to note. Wojtyla speaks of induction and then reduction. At the end, he also speaks of intuition. Induction is generally understood as what is found in the sciences, collecting different cases and from these we argue toward a conclusion. Induction is considered as a collection of cases. Wojtyla, rather, uses it in an Aristotelian sense, as a way to infer from different cases the universal concept. This induction in phenomenological language is called eidetic (essence) reduction, something that permits a vision of the essence. Induction for Wojtyla permits us to infer the unity from a series of experiences. *Epagoge* was the term Aristotle used, which is close to abstraction. Wojtyla didn't speak of abstraction because he wanted to stress that we stay in strict contact with reality. On p. 67, the goal is to penetrate into existing reality, not to abstract as abstraction is normally understood. These approximations for Wojtyla present a certain dialectical or circular reasoning process. Induction permits us to infer the essence of a being.

Reduction, for Wojtyla, means taking the phenomenon back to their appropriate foundations. Induction doesn't explain enough. There is the need for reduction. This is different from eidetic reduction, or phenomenological reduction, or methodological reduction or transcendental reduction (suspending our convictions about the existence

of the phenomenon). Wojtyla doesn't want to suspend the existence of the phenomenon. It is an attempt to reduce the perception of the person to its foundations, to the structures that stand underneath what we observe. This reduction is real, unlike in Kant, but is also the condition for the possibility of the reality we perceive. There is a metaphysical reduction that will permit Wojtyla to resolve different difficult-to-resolve problems that come from phenomenological reduction. Wojtyla wants to show the unity of man within the context of the multitude of his experiences. He wants to show what is underneath. This is the transphenomenology Wojtyla wants to establish, to go from the phenomena to the ontic structures that undergird it. In medicine, there is a semiology, which is an analysis of the signs used in medicine but points to that which is behind, that causes what we observe. The relationship between phenomena and metaphysics is similar.

We see that Wojtyla is concerned with the synthesis or reconciliation between two opposed ideas or traditions, the philosophy of being or classical being and the modern philosophy of the subject. Wojtyla tries to synthesize or reconcile these two great strands. Wojtyla tries to unite some aspects that were unjustifiably absolutized, but which were aspects of reality. To understand man we have to use both traditions. If we reduce man to only one means of analyzing him, we lose something that is crucial. Wojtyla is convinced of the reconciliation of these two currents.

He also tries to unite philosophical and theological anthropology. The Acting Person is a philosophical anthropology that is open to theological anthropology. Man cannot be understood in his deepest sense without Christ. We can learn a lot of man without Christ, but we cannot learn everything about man until we look at him from the theological point of view. If we methodically separate philosophy and theology, we'll lose something of man. In the Catecheses, Wojtyla begins from theology but keeps returning to observing man. There is a certain theological method in Wojtyla which is analogous to his philosophical method. He studies man's action which reveals man in his most essential reality. It's the best means to see man's interiority. When we look at the theological method of Wojtyla, he looks at Christ who reveals the personhood of God to man and the personhood of man to man. Through God's action in relation to man, we can understand much of God. Christ is the action of God par excellence. In Christ, God reveals man to man himself. This explains the anthropocentrism of Wojtyla, expressed in *Redemptor Hominis*. The Church is anthropocentric because God revealed himself as anthropocentric in Christ. When he says that man is the first and last way for the Church, he means that the Church must follow her master who is Christ who has already taken this way. Next time we will focus on the first chapter of *The Acting Person*.

March 24, 2000

Classes 11-12

Introduction to Wojtyla's phenomenology

We will continue our reflection on the philosophy of the person of Karol Wojtyla. As we've seen previously, this philosophy developed through his encounter with other thinkers, but it was presented in an original way, as his philosophy, in *The Acting Person*. It was a certain rethinking and deepening of the philosophy of man and the person that is at the basis of the Second Vatican Council. It is not coincidental that many quotations from *The Acting Person* come from *Gaudium et Spes*. He tries to show in what the transcendent character of the human person consists that needs to be safeguarded.

GS 76. It is very important, especially where a pluralistic society prevails, that there be a correct notion of the relationship between the political community and the Church, and a clear distinction between the tasks which Christians undertake, individually or as a group, on their own responsibility as citizens guided by the dictates of a Christian conscience, and the activities which, in union with their pastors, they carry out in the name of the Church. The Church, by reason of her role and competence, is not identified in any way with the political community nor bound to any political system. She is at once a sign and a safeguard of the transcendent character of the human person.

Transcendence has different meanings in the history of philosophy. We have the theory of the transcendentals as properties of every being in the middle ages. The transcendental philosophy of Kant was something entirely

different. In Wojtyla, transcendence means something completely different. Wojtyla intends it in a particular way, and wants to demonstrate what it means to say that the human person is a transcendent being. So *The Acting Person* is broken down into a few sections:

- 1) We need to speak on consciousness and the efficient causality of man, and the link between the two of these. We have to understand what the conscience is.
- 2) The second part of *The Acting Person* is dedicated to the transcendence of the person. We have to then consider the integration of the person in the act. Man in his actions is an unity of spirit, emotions and body. We have to discuss what this unity consists in and where the principle of unity comes from. We'll speak of integration and the somatic and at the psychic levels.
- 3) The third part of the work concerns participation. This is the section that includes his thought on the role of the person and the community. He makes a summary of the book in 15 pages. It is his self-summary of the most important questions and concepts for him. The second half of this section, after this summary, focuses on participation.

By reflecting on the anthropology of the Council, Wojtyla considers the question of the Council: how to reconcile the right of the truth with the right to freedom? How is freedom fulfilled in the choice of the truth? There's no real liberty if there's no truth. No truth, no freedom. The truth is the condition of freedom. There is no contradiction between freedom and truth, but rather only through the bond with the truth is man truly free. This is a response to the post-modern thought, which says the truth doesn't set us free but makes us slaves.

John 8:31 Then Jesus said to the Jews who had believed in him, "If you continue in my word, you are truly my disciples; 32 and you will know the truth, and the truth will make you free."

In *The Acting Person*, Wojtyla wants to show how this bond between freedom and truth is realized in man beginning from the experience of each man. This will not be an attempt merely to give a Christian anthropology, but a philosophical anthropology. *The Acting Person* follows the method of Husserl, to go to the things themselves. It is not so much an erudite work; we are not bombarded with footnotes. Rather it is the work of a thinker reflecting on experience, who wants to give the word to experience.

But what does experience mean? Wojtyla distinguishes between two opposed conceptions of experience, phenomenalist and phenomenological. The first is the empirical conception of experience, which sees in experience only a complex of emotions or impressions ordered by the intellect. This is the conception that dominated the Anglo-Saxon philosophy of Locke and Hume and remains present in philosophers of this school. If experience is conceived this way, there's no place for ethical experience, which was considered subjective without objective foundation, or of the experience of man as an ontic subject. Hume's thought sustains this notion of experience that the only experience we have is sense experience from the world without any notion of intuitive interior experience. He said man was a connection of sense-experiences without any ontic foundation. But how can we express the unity of experience? Hume, at the end of his *Treatise on Human Nature*, admits sincerely that he is in front of an enigma, that he cannot explain is obvious to him in a certain way — that he is the same person — but he doesn't know why. Wojtyla tries to show that this is not an inexplicable enigma that this phenomenalist conception leaves out the experience that we have of our "I" as a man. Man is not just a string of sense perceptions. We are more than a string of impressions, but our experience tells us something new. But we have to go past the phenomenalist notion of experience to the phenomenological notion of experience.

The phenomenological conception of experience is not restricted to sense impressions but gives us a method to analyze experience in its integrity and wholeness. Sense experience is just one mode of human experience, but in human experience, there is aesthetic, religious and ethical experience that all have to be analyzed and not just reduced out of consideration a priori but methodological means. They have to be analyzed as they come themselves, without reducing them to other experiences. Wojtyla allies himself to Ingarden, Stein, Von Hildebrand, Scheler and

their method, upholding that the phenomena themselves are independent than the consciousness of them. Ingarden said we can't reduce experience to our consciousness. The recognition of consciousness is independent.

For Wojtyla, the world is objective but it is given in our experience. We have to analyze not just the world and objects but also on the way in which the world is given to us. This is the subjective act of experience. We have to reflect on how we experience the world, how we interiorize the world, how it becomes a part of our interior life. Wojtyla in this way wants to built anthropology beginning from man. To begin from man means to build anthropology on original human experience. None of the originality of human experience should be lost, especially the subjective act of experience. Experience, on the other hand, touches reality that exists independently of us and it has its own constitutive act, particularly when it concerns the experience of myself. The philosophy of being has a necessary foundation for the philosophy of consciousness. There cannot be a solid philosophy of consciousness without a vast philosophy of being. As Buttiglione observes, the approach of Wojtyla begins with experience as a whole without favoring the objective or the subjective side. The philosophy of consciousness and the philosophy of being privilege either the external experience or internal experience, without integrating them. Descartes had separated the *res cogitans* and *res extensa* without explaining well how the two go together.

These two perspectives can only be understood together, because experience is unitary as it happens in man. The subject is known by situating himself in the world and by understanding himself as a man-being in the world, as a particular partner of being in the world that is proper to man. Forgetting this, as Descartes did, would make it impossible to know man in the totality of his experience. This obtains, as well, for the philosophy of being, that often forgets that the philosophy of being has first to be the philosophy of the act of being. In the introduction to the Italian edition of *The Acting Person*, Giovanni Reale speaks of the three fundamental forms or paradigms of metaphysics: the metaphysics of the one (Plato), einology; the metaphysics of ontology (Aristotle), the study of being as being; and the metaphysics of the person as a person, of that which is most perfect in all of nature. Wojtyla speaks of the wonder before man, as Aristotle spoke of the beginning of philosophy as wonder before being. Anthropology is born, Wojtyla states, by the wonder in front of man. Naturally, this philosophy of man is built on metaphysics, on the being of man and particularly the act of the being of man.

Experience, for Wojtyla, is a cognitive relation, which distinguishes it from Descartes and his tradition. While Descartes starts from the *cogito ergo sum*, Wojtyla speaks of the *cognosco ergo sum*, which is not just a thought of man but one in which we know something or someone outside of him. The history of the thought of Husserl shows that he went to transcendental thought at the end. It's helpful to make a distinction of a Polish disciple of Franz Brentano, who was at the beginning of phenomenology and made a connection with the thought of St. Thomas, since Brentano was a Dominican priest who was laicized. He took his knowledge of St. Thomas with him. Fardowski was the founder of the most important Polish philosophical school between the cognitive act, the content of this cognitive act and the object of this act. The object itself is always richer than the content we have in our cognitive act. We only know it under a particular aspect. To understand the cognitive act as the cognitive act — and not as the act of thinking — we have to start from the object that makes contact with us that is reflected in experience.

This distinction was not totally clear in phenomenology for several reasons, particularly because many proponents of it because idealists. In the cognitive act for Wojtyla, man goes outside of himself toward reality, toward that which is given in his act.

Transcendence of man

Experience is not just an individual or unique act but a process that allows us to have direct contact with reality. For Wojtyla and for phenomenology, every science has to begin from the direct contact with reality, experience. In experience, substantial simplicity prevails. Many different things constitute our experience, but it's not the case that we reflect that which is given. Experience is not just a reflection of reality; that which happens in experience is an understanding of an object. This is a work of the intellect. The empirical conception of experience is too simplistically formulated. We always see more than what is given to our senses. We understand that a chair has another side to it even though we don't see it. This is the sense of Gestalt. Wojtyla says that our intellect intervenes

right off the bat that allows us to understand the reality that is given to us. Experience is something that leads our understanding through the object which itself guides us. The access to reality is possible. This is the hermeneutic of Wojtyla.

We cannot stop just on experience and the experience present in it. Experience must have a later, ultimate understanding. We pass toward explanation, to a profound explanation. We have to pass from phenomenology to ontology (to the ontological structure of being that we analyze) to metaphysics (to the ultimate explanation of what is given), according to the distinction of Ingarden. Metaphysics is not treated in this way by Wojtyla in *The Acting Person*, but this open to metaphysics is naturally present.

We spoke of the subject of experience in general, but Wojtyla analyzes a particular experience, the experience of man. Wojtyla speaks in the introduction of the most complex and deepest of human experiences. Josef Bohens said that philosophy would be better off if man didn't exist, but he makes philosophy too complicated. Man's experience is the experience that is richest. This experience accompanies every other experience. Man experiences himself in every experience. Without reflecting upon it, I know that I'm thinking of the chair in front of me, and not someone else. Medieval philosophy distinguished between two types of reflection, one natural, the other that is more active. Experiencing something we experience ourselves. It is always an experience of myself, and therefore of man. All of our experience enriches our understanding of man.

On the other hand, man alone is at the same time a subject and an object of experience. In the cognitive act, we are both the subject and object of our knowledge. There are four modes of the experience of man. I experience my interiority and exteriority. Every act expresses the person. I experience the interiority and exteriority of the other. All of this together constitutes the reality that Wojtyla calls the experience of man. It is profoundly unitary, and Wojtyla uses the expression qualitatively identical. There is an interior and exterior side of experience for others and ourselves. The other cannot be experienced from within, but our interiority can be experienced from within. We have a direct experience of our own interiority.

This is not an egology, which exists elsewhere in philosophy (Max Sterner, *The Individual and His Property*). A Russian philosopher said there is no philosophy just philosophers, because there is no universal knowledge and hence we can only know ourselves. Wojtyla wants to see man from within and analyze the contact he has with man through himself. Wojtyla doesn't exclude the possibility of the experience of the other, but the other is in a certain sense incommensurable, because you cannot get to the irreducible core of the other. We are, on the other hand, not limited to egology but can do an anthropology. Edith Stein says we perceive the other person as a person gifted with interiority. We have some access to the other's interiority. In Levinas' or Buber's philosophy of dialogue, the idea is that we become a person only through dialogue with another. This is not the position of Wojtyla, who focuses on the difference between the ontological level (when every person is a person before dialogue) and the phenomenological level (when man, to know himself, needs dialogue and encounters with others). If we consider our experience of others, it's not the way a biologist studies his field. Our experience of man focuses not on biology but on the external form of the person. When we look at his analysis of shame in *Love and Responsibility*, Wojtyla says that in our experience of another, there are more and less important things in determined contexts. This was shown by Sartre in *Being and Nothingness* in another way. What is important in our encounter with others? Why is shame important? We are not appreciated as beings gifted with sexual value, but first of all, through the encounter of eyes. These are the moments that express the interiority of the other. The encounter with the eyes of another is not just the encounter of an object in the world but with someone with interiority, with subjectivity.

The analysis of the experience of man has to take into consideration also this. There is naturally a strong moral dimension. The experience of man is always accompanied by the experience of morality. To experience man means to see not just his otherness with respect to the world but also his superiority, his call to our freedom of not being violated but affirmed. We can say with Spaemann that ethics and anthropology are constituted by the very same act. There cannot be one without the other. Spaemann says that ethics and anthropology, and ethics and metaphysics, are founded together. Another human being is independent from me and we have to accept this structure.

In *The Acting Person*, Wojtyła takes morality outside of parentheses. He wants to see the connection between man and his act. Morality concerns a free act with responsibility. On the other hand, this is not a total abstraction from morality. When we read *The Acting Person*, we see that the dimension of morality is always present, but present in its subjective dimension. Ethics is not treated here as a problem of the norms, of justifying or enumerating them, etc. The question is how man experiences and lives morality. Ethics would be more objective.

Wojtyła says that the experience of man is very complex. So the question is where to begin. Every anthropology has its fundamental experience from which it begins. Karl Jaspers says it is the limiting situations of life (death, suffering); Heidegger, it's care; Marcel, it's hope; Buber, it's encounter with the other; for Marx, it's work. Wojtyła's fundamental experience is the experience of the human act. The act is privileged by Wojtyła because it is a particular moment of the experience of man which is connected to the fact that man acts. I act. For Wojtyła, this action is the revealer of the person himself. There are different reasons why this is so. We could start from different starting points, but man manifests himself in that which is essentially and only human, in human acts. We are still persons when we eat and sleep like persons, but there are human acts that are of a different order. We can ask the question of what makes human acts possible. The act is understood as a window to my interiority and to the interiority of others.

This is true also from the metaphysical point of view. Every realization is the realization of a potency. A seed has a potency to become a tree. Every realization is the realization in act of some potency, as we see in classical metaphysics. In the action of man, we can experience this metaphysical principle and reality. The act is not just a realization of a potency but is an *actus humanus* or an *actus personae*. In the act, man experiences himself as a subject and recognizes morality. At the level of morality, man is realized as a man. Wojtyła wants to understand man in what is most distinctive about man. We can say that in the act of a person the whole person participates. It's not just an act of his consciousness or spirituality, but all parts of the person is involved. His emotional and somatic parts also participate with his spirit and consciousness. We can understand better how man may be a unity of body and spirit. The act most often becomes public, because it has intersubjective consequences and controls. This is another reason why anthropology is not egology, because the act exteriorizes the person and puts the person into contact with others.

Wojtyła assumes the role of a master and helps us to understand our experience of man on the basis of the qualitative identity of man. We are human beings. We are men. We will try to deepen this subject the next time.

March 31, 2000

Classes 13-14

Introduction to consciousness in Wojtyła

We started last time on Wojtyła's philosophy of man in his most original sense. We spoke on the experience of man. This experience has different components. Everything we experience is given to us in a certain way. We are conscious of what we experience; moreover, we are self-conscious. All of this is very important for the philosophy of man. Man seems to be the only being in this world that experiences himself in this way, as conscious and self-conscious. This has everything to do with his subjectivity, with his ontological structure as a subject. We'll try to develop this aspect of consciousness in Wojtyła. Wojtyła, after the introduction, speaks of the subject of consciousness. He shows how man is a subject through his consciousness and experience. He tries to analyze what this experience consists in. Man is a subject, is a person, but only through consciousness is he given to himself as a person.

This theme of consciousness is central for almost all of modern philosophy and its problem of personal subjectivity. To a certain point, modern philosophy is a philosophy of consciousness. There is a distinction between consciousness and moral conscience, which doesn't exist in Italian. In the first chapter of *The Acting Person*, he speaks of consciousness and not moral conscience. Everything we know is given to us in consciousness. Descartes

and modern philosophy begin from this given of being conscious of my own thought. For Descartes this is the one indubitable thing. It can be put into doubt a little, but fallor ergo sum, as St. Augustine wrote against the ascetics. Consciousness is indubitable. The way to conceive consciousness is a novum in the philosophy of Wojtyla. It distinguishes him from all of phenomenology and modern philosophy. We'll see this later today.

Today, we will see, in the context of contemporary philosophy, there is a certain ambivalence about conceiving man. Man is considered by some as an object (a material object) and consciousness realizes it as an epiphenomenon. In positivist thinkers, many conceive man as an epiphenomenalist. Consciousness is seen as a superstructure of that which really exists, which is matter. On the other hand, there is another philosophical line that conceives man as a subject who is identified with his consciousness of his freedom. The objective dimension is forgotten a little. Wojtyla wants to save both dimensions of man, how he experiences himself as a subject and as an object through his consciousness and self-consciousness. Man is given to himself as a subject who possesses an objective structure, one that constitutes human nature which is universal. This is often denied. Modern philosophy of consciousness — from Descartes to Husserl — explored consciousness and headed toward absolutizing it.

This is the epistemologization of anthropology. Descartes' anthropology was epistemology. The whole cognitive process was closed in consciousness. This is the trapping of reflection. This leads to the difficulty in seeing what is the connection with consciousness and the real world. There is the need to construct a "bridge" in modern philosophy, because modern philosophers say all we know is our self-consciousness. Husserl doesn't escape from this reflection trap, because in his thought of consciousness (the transcendental ego) constructs the person. The starting point was perhaps erroneous. The starting from the cogito ergo sum was erroneous, because this was not the original point of the cognitive experience of man. This is the original sin of modern philosophy. Gilson said when you start from the cogito you can never achieve reality, because it's not even the original starting point of our cognitive processes. Wojtyla shows that the starting point of consciousness loses something that is central for human thought processes, the reality that is included in thought.

Another philosophical trend is the philosophers of suspicion, Marx, Nietzsche and Freud. They believed that consciousness deceives us. Jacques Lacquanne, a French psychoanalyst, used to ask his students: who speaks when I speak? The typical response was "I." But it only seems that I speak. The one who really speaks, in the conception of Freud, is my instincts of self-preservation and sexuality. Marx would say that I don't speak, but rather the social class to which I belong. My self-consciousness is in a certain sense secondary, because I can't have any other consciousness than of my class. We have to beware consciousness for all of these.

Wojtyla says we have consciousness and self-consciousness. I know that I'm speaking when I'm speaking. I know that I'm here in this classroom. To understand this consciousness, there are two ways. One is internal (what I'm doing) and another is external (knowing our consciousness through our act of self-consciousness). I can not only experience what I do but I can return upon this experience and make all of this the object of my self-consciousness. I am not just conscious of the act but I can have the knowledge of the consciousness of my act. This is a little complicated but man is complicated. This does not mean a reification of consciousness and experience. When I do the act of self-consciousness, some criticize, they make man an object and man is not an object. They say we lose something that is essential for man. Therefore, they say that we cannot experience ourselves.

For Wojtyla, there is the process of self-consciousness, making myself an object of my consciousness, without losing the subjective dimension of experience. This is possible because of the structure of human consciousness. Thanks to this structure, man is revealed as a subject and an object at the same time. We're trying to deepen our understanding of this structure of the nature of consciousness. We are capable of experiencing ourselves as subjects, know ourselves as subjects, and know the structure of all of these.

Wojtyla's notion of consciousness

We can start in this analysis by what Wojtyla denies. Wojtyla denies that consciousness is of an autonomous subject. Consciousness is an attribute of a person in the world. From the ontological point of view, consciousness is secondary; it is something that comes from being. When I say that I was born in 1970, I'm not speaking from my

experience. I'm not speaking from my consciousness. I identify with the little child I was and can say that "I was born on that day," but it is not consciousness, which developed later. Many very young children use the third person in speaking because consciousness develops. The subject is real and existing in the world. But concrete man is the autonomous subject for Wojtyła, not consciousness.

Another thing Wojtyła denies is that consciousness is intentional, not in the moral sense, but in the sense of heading toward an object. For phenomenology, consciousness is intentional and moves toward an object. Consciousness is always an awareness of something. It always has its own content. Consciousness, for others, is what puts us in contact with others. Wojtyła disagrees. Consciousness naturally possesses a cognitive part but it is not intentional. It is not consciousness that unveils the object, because it's not its nature to be in contact with an object. All of man is accessible to man. In what way is the world present in him? The cognitive act has an intentional character, but we cannot say the same thing of consciousness. The *raison d'être* of the conscious act doesn't exist in a deep penetration of the object, of objectifying something. It's not consciousness that's intentional, but knowledge. The act of knowledge puts us into contact with reality. This has a great importance for the debate between illuminism and rationalism. He didn't develop this point but it could be developed. Reflection is always secondary. Our contact with reality is primary. We go beyond ourselves in order to enter into reality. The *cogito* alone isn't possible without contact with reality. The thing awakens our consciousness. Consciousness cannot give its own contents. If we're not in contact with reality through cognitive acts, consciousness would remain void. It would have no content. The philosophy of consciousness generally begins from the secondary aspects of knowledge; the first, according to Wojtyła, is the cognitive contact with reality.

Man has this faculty that we call consciousness. The role of consciousness is not to enter intentionally into contact with the world, even about ourselves. We precede self-consciousness with self-knowledge. The function of consciousness is not intentional, not content-based, but rather has two functions: the reflecting of that which man knows and the interiorization of that which man knows through the cognitive act. We have to penetrate more deeply into these two functions. The first function is to reflect that which man knows. This reflective function mirrors to us what we know. We can reflect on what happens in us. Consciousness is not just a mirror. It has the capacity to illuminate that which is reflected. Light is a very important image in epistemology through the ages. This intellectual light is a property of a spiritual being. The content of our knowledge, thanks to our consciousness, isn't temporary or fleeting. Through consciousness, this cognitive content remains in us and becomes part of ourselves. Without knowledge, consciousness would have nothing to reflect or illuminate. It would be void. But without knowledge that is known through our experience of knowing the world, consciousness would be empty. But without consciousness, knowledge would basically disappear. Animal's consciousness, insofar as we know, remains at the sensible level. There is no dimension of illumination or reflection on that which has happened to it.

In our consciousness, there is also self-consciousness. Man returns continually toward himself. I look at myself as a subject of my knowledge. But my consciousness reflects the content of my self-knowledge. We can see that self-knowledge is the foundation of self-consciousness. The object of self-knowledge is also consciousness, but not as something abstract, but as something concrete, as my own ego.

The second function of consciousness also clarifies and explains how it is possible to have an objective knowledge of the subject, something that the existentialists said was impossible. How can we have an objective knowledge of the subject which remains subjective and not universal? Man is not just a subject who acts consciously, but experiences himself as an acting subject. This is the subjectification of everything we experience. Our knowledge is always personalized. Consciousness allows man to experience everything as his own even before the act of self-consciousness. Everything is reflected as connected with my person, with the ego. This is very important for the conception of morality. It shows us that our knowledge is not an objective knowledge in an impersonal way, but it is subjective because it is personal. I know through a spontaneous connection with the thing known. I'm a witness of what I know. It is rooted in the structure of man as such. Through this reflection function of consciousness, I commit myself, I live as an I. There is a natural turning to the subject without a specific act. Thanks to this function, we experience ourselves as subjects, we know our irrepeatability.

We can distinguish three dimensions of the subjectivity of man. The first level is the ontological being of the subject. Man is a substance as a subject. Secondly, he objectively knows himself as a subject. Thirdly, he can experience himself interiorly as a subject. Man is a subject in all three senses. This is very important in the knowledge of the person. Consciousness is essential to experience oneself as a person, but doesn't constitute his being a person, because the latter is ontological and exists independently of one's consciousness. Modern philosophy said that man is not real if he doesn't pass through consciousness. For man as a subject, it is real that which he experienced as real, they would say. This is not a secondary construction to God's original construction, however, for Wojtyla. I live in a way that becomes real for me through reflection. It is my world in an irrepeatable way. There is a relative truth that I experience because I relate to the truth, which doesn't mean that it isn't true or that I constitute the truths of my world. Through the act of knowledge we can try to verify our construction of the world. This is the verification of the truth. Freedom is possible through this complex of separation from the world in consciousness and entrance to the world through knowledge. There is no opposition between freedom and truth.

Thanks to consciousness, we experience ourselves as the ontological supposita we are. We see ourselves from within as supposita. We experience ourselves as "I"s. For this reason I can say "I." This expression has no universal specificity. When Hume analyzed the "I" from the empirical perspective, he said that it has no specific content. Hume saw what was true here. The "I" is not something that is constitutive of some content, but it is a reaction to our whole human nature, of our reaction to ourselves. After an accident, a man can ask himself who he is. He can forget everything that had happened up until that point. But he still uses this first-person pronoun. This is the core of the notion of person: my relation to everything that is mine. Everything that I know and experience is in some way mine, but I am in some sense someone who stands under all of this from a phenomenological point of view. At the ontic level, there is the possibility of self-construction. I exist as an ontic possibility and not just a phenomenological possibility.

The role of man in knowledge is very important. Man experiences himself truly as a subject when he lives with a full knowledge and realization of his subjectivity. This is an essential aspect of his action. We have to retain both the objective and the subjective aspects of man. This was present in St. Thomas' actus humanus, or in the definition of man as a rational animal, but it wasn't very well developed and analyzed. This is what Wojtyla tries to do. He tried to show how man lives his subjectivity. The whole of man is not experienced or interiorized by consciousness. There are three dynamisms in man that have a different relationship with consciousness. In the first place, we can distinguish a vegetative dynamism, which often doesn't impact our consciousness very much. We do take account of these dynamisms often, but mostly when they break down. In normal circumstances I don't take much notice of my liver, except if it starts to break down. In the normal functioning of our body, this vegetative dynamism functions independently. The second dynamism is emotive. The vegetative dynamism is in a certain sense mediated by our emotions. Emotivity has its own laws. Our emotions are something that is often in our consciousness. There is also a dimension that Freud calls subconscious, which Wojtyla dedicates a paragraph to in *The Acting Person*. We are not consciousness of it but it's on the edge of being realized. The importance of consciousness as a whole is shown by this subconscious, because often the latter becomes conscious. The third dynamism is personal or spiritual, where man acts as a person.

The person, man, is not just this third dynamism, which is properly personal, but is a dynamic synthesis of all three, each of which has its own laws. There is a certain integration or harmony of these three levels in a man. Wojtyla speaks of the emotionalization of the consciousness, which happens when man is taken over by his emotions and led by them. Man can become immersed in his emotions. This was the great error of Scheler, because he stopped at the emotionalization of consciousness. Man experiences his emotions emotionally at times, but this is not the most human way to experience this level. Man cannot become immersed and dragged by these emotions. It is something that shows what is the task of man in confrontation with his consciousness, that he must make a rational judgment of his will and emotions. He has to know according to the truth. When I mature, there is a certain balance among these functions. Naturally, we're not treating of living in a rigid way about what he's experiencing as if he can't experience anything spontaneously. But we're talking about balancing one's interior life that one experiences personally. We want both spontaneity and the truth. This balance between these poles is regulated by the virtues, which is something we're not going to analyze here.

We see that thanks to consciousness, man experiences his ontic subjectivity. Man is not just a rational animal but is a person. Wojtyla says that man is a subject and is fully in act only when he experiences himself as in act. This perception was lacking in the philosophy of Aristotle. Man is more than a rational animal. He is the subject of his own rational choice as well. For Aristotle, his choice was only about means. For Wojtyla, man is not just an animal who is rational, but is the person who possesses in himself this rationality and will. He possesses these. It is very important for us to focus on these to ground our experience. We cannot stop at the definition of rational animal for this reason. We need a conception of person that we'll deepen later. This has moral consequences, because in no action, even in an evil one, is man expressed fully. Man is something always greater. We can never say to someone you are always this way, because man is always something greater. This is a subject against the death penalty for sure.

April 7, 2000

Classes 15-16

Freedom in the thought of Wojtyla

We can take up our reflection on man according to the reflection of Karol Wojtyla. We've discussed how many experiences himself as a subject through his consciousness. We can ask ourselves where man experiences himself as a personal subject in the most conspicuous way. For Karol Wojtyla this experience is crucially important, where he lives his subjectivity. He experiences this subjectivity in action. We will focus today and next week on how Wojtyla shows us the structure and essence of human freedom. To capture the essence of freedom is very important for Wojtyla. In freedom is expressed that which is most personal, most particular in man. We will try to analyze the determinism proper to man. Wojtyla analyzes man as a being in action. He doesn't focus so much on the ontological structure of man but tries to analyze man as he realizes himself, how he becomes himself. He analyzes man in his dynamic dimension.

For this reason, we're concerned in our analysis of freedom to show the structure of self-determination in man. This is most characteristic of man. Man is the only being in this world who determines himself. This has a personal structure for man. Man is capable of self-determination because he is a person. He is determined within and from within. We really cannot speak of a free animal, although he's not on a chain, although he lives alone in the woods. The animal is determined from within but he doesn't have a free space within himself. The animal only has external freedom to satisfy his own instincts. The dog in the woods is always chained by his instincts. Man determines himself from within. He determines the way of following his instincts and tendencies. He can deny following his instinct and tendency.

We can try to clarify the idea of liberty present in Wojtyla. This is important for what concerns the discussion in contemporary moral theology as covered in *Veritatis Splendor*. VS covered the bond between freedom and truth. What does this bond mean? We can analyze what it means in *The Acting Person*. Freedom is a fundamental idea for westerners and is always a value. Every other value can be identified with liberty. It can be named as a liberty to do something. Freedom is not just a property of western man, but it was formulated in the modern way in western culture.

When we look at Greek philosophy, this idea of liberty wasn't present in the sense in which we conceive it today. When the Greeks spoke of the free woman, they were speaking of an unmarried woman. A freeman wasn't a slave and was a citizen. The Stoics said that every man possesses the same dignity and the same freedom, although this didn't mean that everything was fine socially. Christianity had deepened the idea of interior liberty in the freedom from sin. It also developed the idea of the freedom of the will.

In Medieval philosophy, there were two great conceptions of liberty that we could identify with St. Thomas and Duns Scotus. St. Thomas' conception of freedom was intellectualistic, following Aristotle's framework. There was a tendency toward a good in man, but in an indeterminate way. Then intelligence shows us what is good. This

tendency of the will is natural; man adheres to the good. If he did not adhere to the good, it's because he didn't see another good. We have to say when we analyze the first questions of the Summa of St. Thomas, freedom comes not from the obviousness of the good. We are free because we don't know everything that is good. If we knew everything, there would be no liberty because we're not perfectly wise. This is what goes into his interpretation of the sin of the angels. In this vision, there's some difficulty of interpretation.

Against St. Thomas was Duns Scotus. He had a voluntaristic conception of freedom. He thought the will was that which is most perfect in man and was not bound by anything, including the tendency toward happiness. In his discussion with St. Thomas, he spoke of the two natural affections of the will. One he called *affectio concomodi* (affection toward that which satisfies my attention toward happiness), which, in citing St. Anselm, focused on the natural tendency of the will to that which has to be affirmed by our liberty. He also spoke of the *affectio iustitiae*. Man is in the position to choose one or the other in a determined case. On the heels of Duns Scotus, we have the voluntaristic conception of judgment. Reason presents us different things but judgment awaits the will to say it wants or chooses something. Intellect presents us possibilities. This is important to understand the conception of morality in Wojtyla. He speaks of the normativity of the truth in this sense. Every act of human knowledge leads to an act of the choice of the will. He doesn't make a great distinction of truth as an object of the reason and the good as an object of the will. This history of the term freedom is important.

When we look at the history of freedom in the west, that which distinguished man in the Medieval mind, was the possibility to know the truth (for both St. Thomas and Duns Scotus). This possibility of knowing and coming to the knowledge of the truth distinguished man from the animals who didn't have this truth. Man is capable of knowing the truth about things has been less and less appreciated throughout the centuries. Kant's philosophy is a vertex of this way of thinking. There was a split between man's knowledge and the world. He was closed within his categories that are inherent to his way of knowing. The distinction between the animals and man for modern philosophy is something that is less than with Thomas because of the skepticism in man. Man is distinguished from animals because man is free. Some interpretations of Kant say that the whole interpretation of the world is freedom. Man chooses his own vision of the world. There has been a rupture of the connection between liberty and truth. This is something that is obvious for medieval philosophy. For modern philosophy, man constitutes his world according to his will. Fichte said the person creates the world in the ontological sense. I create the world in an axiological way as well. All modern subjectivism is justified by this development of the idea of liberty. There is a post-modernism in Foucault that says the truth enslaves me.

We see this idea in modern theology in one current who identified man with essential freedom. We see in *Veritatis Splendor* that this was criticized by the Pope. If we identify man with freedom, a crisis of the natural law follows. Values cannot be known on their own but have to be imposed by freedom. We have to proceed in our analysis by showing how we experience liberty, how it is given to us. This is what Wojtyla does in *The Acting Person*. He wants to show our experience of liberty. He takes on some of the currents from our contemporary culture. It is, on the one hand, the culture of liberty, but there is a great determinism that exists at the same time, coming from science. This leads us to the determination of everything. Liberty would be canceled. There is this fission between determinism and indeterminism, where man is treated as someone who decides everything.

How is this conception of liberty formulated by Wojtyla? He starts from the dynamism of man, which shows us to different structures. One structure we can call "something that happens in man" and then other structure is "I act." Both structures in metaphysical terms realize something in man. But from the metaphysical point of view, they are similar; but from the experiential point of view, there is a difference. The metaphysical categories aren't always the best formulation of man's experience. According to the classic idea of *operari sequitur esse*, action follows being. This points to the primacy of the existence of being, but also to the essential level. Action is a consequence and expression of a specific nature of the agent. We can interpret this nature exactly by analyzing how the nature expresses itself in action. How do we differentiate these two structures, between man acting and man having something happen in him. We can adopt another expression, that something happens with man rather than in man. We see that when something happens with man, he's something that happens from without; rather, when something happens in man, he's a subject of it. When something happens with man the cause is external to man.

When something happens in me or when I act, in both cases the foundation of the realization of myself is within me.

But both don't realize man in the same way. Man is an object who is realized, who is dynamized in different ways. What permits us to distinguish these two structures is the experience of man to be the author of action, the efficient cause of the act which is not present in something that happens in me. I am not the efficient cause of something that happens in me. The experience of the operativity is present in one structure and not in the other. For this reason, we can say that in one of the structures man acts and his freedom is employed. By making the experience of his being the cause of action, man discovers that he is at the same time immanent and transcendent in his action. I am present in this action, but I am something more. I can be differentiated from my actions. We can differentiate between the activity of man in which he is the subject of his action and the passivity of man in which he is a terrain in which something happens. We can differentiate between the act and the activation that happens in man. I am the cause of my activation in a way that's completely different than in an act, in which I experience my own subjectivity.

There is a different relationship of ownership of these actions. When something happens in me, it is my experience, but my ownership is different than in situations in which I act. I don't perceive myself as a cause and the relationship with the ego is not so strict. We have the experience lived by the efficient causality in others. In my personal experience, I experience really what it means to be the efficient cause of an effect. It's interesting to look at those who denied the existence of the personal ego; they have also denied efficient causality, such as in Hume. There is no room for efficient causality nor for man. I know what it means to be a cause of an effect. We can also discuss the moment of responsibility. I experience myself responsible for my act, but not for what happens in me. There is a need to distinguish between the motive and vegetative life. I experience myself as responsible for actions in a moral sense, but not for what happens in me, although there might be some cooperation in me. In gratification, man is not just an agent but is a creator of action. He creates something in the world that is something completely new, initiated by his act. This is his decision at the origin of man. This moment of creativity has its dimension that concerns the subject himself. Through the act, and through the moral value of the act, man creates himself. It is not the case in the structure of what happens in him. We don't create in the latter sense. To this distinction, we have the corresponding distinction between *actus hominis* and *actus humanus*, but this is a thing of words, because every *actus humanus* is an *actus hominis*. So we need experience.

This experience of these two structures says something to us about the structure of man. Man is a suppositum in the metaphysical sense, a subject. But here Wojtyla makes a distinction on the phenomenological analysis of the human phenomenon. Wojtyla distinguishes between the subjectivity and the operativity of man. Subjectivity is that which is responsible for the activations of man that do not have root in his operativity. Man is a subject in this way; he is a terrain in which this actualization takes place. On the other hand, there is the experience of the operativity of man, in which man experiences himself as the cause of his action. On p. 193, he says subjectivity is connected with what happens structurally to man; operativity is related to what happens intentionally in man. Subjectivity indicates the ego that finds himself under the realization of his dynamism. Wojtyla develops both structures, but there's a risk to formulate two worlds for man, operativity and subjectivity/passivity. Something happened like this in Kant, between the phenomenon and noumenon, where there was no connection between these two human worlds. We cannot get out of this bypass without a phenomenological bridge. Kant stressed the operativity; Scheler the passivity. When we analyze our experience, we experience ourselves as subjects of both activity and passivity.

Wojtyla tries to synthesize both. There needs to be a metaphysical reduction that shows man as a suppositum of existence and of its dynamism. He is a suppositum, that which is under. Everything substantial being is a suppositum, but man is a suppositum as a person. He is particular. What does this mean? Man is something more than individualized nature. Man possesses his own nature. This means that man is not just an individual like everything suppositum or existence substance but is unique and irrepeatable. Man is someone and not something. There is a distance between him and every suppositum that is just something.

There is a distinction between person and nature which is important to understand the previous distinctions. In Wojtyla, the distinction between nature and person is different than in Rahner. In Wojtyla, this distinction means

more or less that nature is that which is responsible from the phenomenological point of view for the passivity or subjectivity of man. Nature signifies that which is given (nascor). It means an activity given to man almost from the beginning. It is responsible for the subjectivity of man, but man as a person is manifested in his operativity. From the point of view of our experience, there is a unity of person and nature. We experience both a difference and a unity here. There is a need for their integration because there is only one human suppositum. Everything that happens in man is the property of the ego. Human nature exists in the human person. To be the human person, human nature is an abstract. Human nature is always concrete and individualized, possessed by a human person. On the other hand, human nature which is possessed by a person is blessed with a structure that allows man to act as a person. From the phenomenological point of view, there is a distinction between person and nature. There is a metaphysical reduction here. Nature in the metaphysical sense refers to the essence of a being. Nature is adopted to identify the proper mechanisms of a being. Nature is at the basis of every activation of a being.

These two meanings of nature, phenomenological and metaphysical, show their difference when we analyze man. It belongs to the nature of man in the metaphysical sense that being is possessed by a person. Christ is a person who possesses two natures. A person is someone who possesses a nature. But can the nature be possessed by a man? Nature is integrated in a person and exists only by existing in a person. Nature in the phenomenological sense is causal in a different way than that which happens in a person. There is an opposition to the person. In the metaphysical sense, in the sense of the nature of man understood metaphysically, nature is the source of the cohesion existentially between what man is by nature and his action. We have *operari sequitur esse*. We can see it from the existential point of view, we can see it also from the essential point of view. Nature is the foundation of the essential link between being and action. This nature is possessed by a human person. For this reason, man is not identified with all of nature. To be a man, to be a human person, is not simply an example of the species of man, like a dog of the species dog. Man is not a concretization of the universal sense of man, but a fully personally existence. He is unique and irrepeatable. For this reason, as we will see later, this will help us to understand how man is free, can be free, and in what freedom consists.

It is not sufficient for man to realize the proper good of his species, by responding to natural inclinations leading to this end. But this is inserted in his nature. There are natural inclinations in St. Thomas. But these inclinations are not the ultimate reason of human action. When we focus on procreation as the principal end of marriage, we're doing it solely on the basis of nature. But love is present as well. Man is not just someone who exists to perpetuate his species, but also to live his nature in a personal way. Everything that pertains to human nature — inclinations, instincts — are reasons for action, because they identify some of our human goods. But they are only *prima facie* reasons for action. Instincts are not bad and we can't speak badly of them, but they do not determine our action. They indicate goods for us but the way to pursue these goods has to be personal. In fact, man is not determined by his action. His act, that which is more strictly personal, depends on his person. As we'll see next time more fully, freedom is above all a dependence, not an independence, despite what we think. It is dependent on the act of the person. In our experience of operativity in the human act, we discover the level of freedom which is not present in the structure of what happens in man. I can do something but I am not obliged to do it. This is the content of consciousness because it is given in our consciousness. We call this faculty in which this happens the will, which is that which permits man to will. The most appropriately personal aspect of the human act is freedom. This freedom is important for man to become man. He creates himself on the basis of the first gift of being he receives. He doesn't create himself *ex nihilo*. But man creates himself through his actions, through the moral value of his actions. He becomes therefore morally good or bad. Man experiences his liberty. We have here the problem we need to tackle. Our experience of freedom — we have to ask — is it experienced in the expression that I can but I am not obliged? We'll analyze this the next time.

April 14, 2000
Classes 17-18

Self-determination and freedom

Last time we focused on freedom in Karol Wojtyła, analyzing the distinction between the act of man and that which happens in man. We said that freedom is revealed in the experience we can call “I can, but I’m not obliged to.” This is the initial experience of freedom that needs to be deepened. I can but I’m not constrained to. When we recognize that a moment of freedom is present, we see it’s more than I can but I’m not constrained to, but I want something also enters. This experience is distinct from the experience of there’s a desire in me — *mi viene voglia*. There’s a difference between I want and there’s a want in me. I have a desire in me and I want or desire is a distinction that is found in the drama of the human person. We’ll speak more about this later.

Wojtyła tries to discuss the conditions of the possibility of the experience of I want. We aren’t talking about the transcendental conditions of Kant; Wojtyła looks for them in the ontic structure of the person. What corresponds to the experience I want in the structure of the person. We can say that the experience of I want corresponds to the faculty of the will, the will as a real potentiality of the subject who is every man. Man is capable of wanting his act. In experience, freedom is revealed not just as the liberty of the will (*liberum arbitrium*, of the free act or choice) but of the person as a whole. It is revealed as the capacity of the person who does acts. The will is given to us as the property of the person. On the one hand, the will is a property of the person, but on the other hand, the person is manifested through the will. This relation of the manifestation of the person through the will, through his acts, is called by Wojtyła self-determination. This expression can have two senses with a clear distinction between them: (1) It is I myself who decide; (2) I decide *di me stesso* (about myself). The properly personal becoming for Wojtyła is realized through self-determination, through man who determines himself in both senses. It’s worth it to penetrate the structure of self-determination and how man is revealed in both these senses.

The experience of self-determination shows that the will isn’t seen so much as independence (as it is when it is considered abstractly like Ockham did), but rather as a dependence in the first place on the proper ego, on the self. I depend on myself. I am free — I can, but I’m not constrained — because it’s only I who decides my decisions. This dependence on the self is called the vertical transcendence of the person. This is the transcendental character of the person. Transcendence has two meanings and this is the first. It is “I” who am the vertex on which action depends. Wanting is not just the direction toward an object, like when I have a desire for something; but it truly depends on the person, on the self. In experience, there are different choices. We’ll focus on the I can. This hides the mystery of identity. This points to the profoundest depths of who I am. I would have to express myself as a subject to avoid being a thing. I would not experience myself as a subject if I became just a thing. I have to experience myself as a subject, in the experience of I can. This is placed on the ontological level. It is not just one of the properties of the human being, but in some way, it constitutes the reality of the person. The person is a free being. Freedom belongs to the substantial character of the human person. The freedom of the human person is not just the freedom of the will of the person.

On p. 323, Wojtyła writes that the existence of the person is identified as the concrete center of freedom. Wojtyła welcomes the great push of modern thought, which identified man with liberty. He welcomes it by saying that to be a person means to be a center of liberty, but corrects it insofar as it may not be reconcilable with our experience of self-determination. This is why the latter is so important. Wojtyła sees in the experience of self-determination a double dependence: (1) on myself (vertical); and (2) because I depend on myself, I depend on the truth that is known by me. This connection between freedom and truth is essential to understand the meaning of freedom. Modern philosophy has lost the trust in the ability of man to know the truth and understood freedom as pure independence. We saw this in structuralism and post-modernism. Man depends on his instincts, on society and so forth. For Wojtyła, to understand the meaning of freedom, it has to be understood in this double-dependence. Today we will focus on the dependence of the person on himself; next time, we’ll focus on the dependence of the truth.

Thanks to the self-determination, man experiences himself as a person. This experience of self-determination does not constitute ontologically the personality of the human being, because man is more than a conception, but the personality of man in the full sense is manifested above all in the experience of self-determination. Man is realized as a person only through this experience of self-determination. To be a person fully is to decide for oneself. We can recall Dante in the *Inferno* speaks of those who never made a decision that didn’t even make a decision to enter hell. Wojtyła would agree with Dante, that a person who never made a personal decision wouldn’t have a moral

decision, but this would have been impossible for Wojtyła, for he thinks every person makes such a decision. It's not always observable. Every actus internus is an externalization of the person, because it is an expression of his being a person. Every person, therefore, from the external point of view, acts. Dante's idea remains valid — to be a person, it is necessary to act as a person.

Wojtyła perceives freedom positively, which allows man to fulfill and realize himself through personal acts. His realization as a person depends on freedom. It is a positive value. Sartre said we were condemned to freedom; Wojtyła thinks completely differently. Freedom is an opportunity for every man. It is something that is given to us, but something that is also conquered. Hegel's Slave-Master dialectic refers to an external dynamic. A slave is someone who is a servant of an external master. For Wojtyła, there would be an internal dynamic. We can be the master of ourselves or the slaves of ourselves, when we lost our freedom. Hegelian masters could hence be internal slaves. The person has to be conquered. There is a certain mastery of self that is necessary. This dependence, this verticality, is something that every man must realize.

Freedom is more than this dependence on oneself, however. Freedom is also a certain independence. It is a dependence on the self. What is it an independence from? From external factors, from the arbitrary of others (external patrons) but also from internal factors, instincts and emotions, from sin (in the theological sense). In the fundamental, anthropological sense of this independence, according to Wojtyła, the independence we're speaking of enters into the very constitution of freedom is from the object of willing in the intentional act. What does this mean? In the intentional act, man goes beyond the limits of himself toward the object. This is the direction of the self toward something. The intentional act is the direction experienced by man in directing himself toward an object. Man is capable of going beyond himself toward an object. Horizontal transcendence is invoked here (going beyond the limits of one's subjectivity toward the object), which is different from vertical transcendence (dependence on oneself). If man were closed only in his consciousness, he would be trapped within a subjectivism. But man doesn't act in this way. He goes beyond his subjectivity toward an objective reality. When we speak of conscious action, this doesn't mean just that I am the subject of my action, but this is action guided by a cognitive act. Conscious action refers to the objective truth known through cognition. When we speak of human acts, they are guided by this knowledge.

Animals are guided in some way by knowledge of reality, but this is different. They know the objects of their action, want something and are directed toward it, but what determines their action and gives unity to it are instincts (self-preservation, sex, etc.). Animals act at the level of nature which is characterized by a certain necessity. It is not this way with man. Man has an independence from the object of the intentional act. Man is not determined by his object of willing, but depends rather on himself. He's not determined by the object of his cognitive act or willing. The act of willing is independent from the object. The object constitutes the reason for willing and attracts us. But it doesn't determine us. There is a natural tension of the will toward the good according to St. Thomas. St. Thomas calls the will an appetite for this reason; otherwise the world would not be attractive for us. But this is only a tension, as is instinct, which St. Thomas calls an impulse in man, that moves us but doesn't determine us. The tension toward the object doesn't determine the choice of the object. There's a detachment between me and the object that permits me to choose.

In one interpretation of this appetite of St. Thomas, one could say that the will has an intention toward the good, beautiful and true in an indeterminate way. This would allow freedom to come into play, in determining the good, beautiful and true. But this would be a notion that our stupidity sets us free. But Wojtyła understands freedom as something more. There's more than just this attraction but there's the decision, as we find on p. 313. The person himself goes toward the good. That which is true in this conception of the appetite is that the liberty is for the object and for the value. Willing is a tendency which implies a certain dependence on the objects, for Wojtyła, but this doesn't destroy the fact of the independence we find in every "I want." The dependence doesn't destroy my independence. In Scheler, this attraction is closed on the attraction of the value that attracts us. The person in Scheler is not an ontic center of action who decides. Wojtyła says it's not like this. There is a *wortantwort*, but this is an intensity of values that happens in man. The decision is the act of the person, which goes toward a more important value, the "I choose." The good provides the motivation, which moves us. We could distinguish between

two situations, one in which a value attracts me, but one in which there are several values that attract me. This second situation is more salient to the subject at hand.

When there is only one value, there's no real need to choose among several goods, although there is a need to choose it. But when there are several goods attracting our will, we have to choose among the goods. I can desire to go to the bar and to visit my sick aunt at the same time and I have to decide. There is a discussion of motives for Wojtyła. There are different motives and different levels. I have to make a choice among the different motives. Naturally there is a choice in the first case, when the person shows that he is independent of the object of his willing. This transcendence of the person is constituted by the double-transcendence, horizontal (independence from the objects that can be known in a cognitive way) and vertical (self-dependence). In man there is another tension, because the act of freedom is not just realized in the spiritual sphere of man. There exists in man a tension between the will and the potentiality of the body. This tension does not cancel free choice, but can condition the emotionalization of the consciousness. Choice can be affected by emotions that can overpower the person. Hence there has to be the integration of the person in the act. In the Catecheses on the Body, John Paul II analyzes man in his original situation. The decision is always personal. When he analyzes original nudity, because in his original situation, the first man saw woman in the full truth of her person. For this reason, he was not dragged along by his emotions to use the other person. When we analyze the freedom of man, we see that freedom is neither determinism or indeterminism, but self-determinism. In the first place, it consists in the dependence on the self and the independence from objects. In the dynamism of the person, liberty is at the center. Instinct is a property of nature.

We could ask a later question: what in the structure of the person makes possible the experience of self-determination possible? The experience of self-determination unveils two structures which provide the ontic structure of man. The two are self-possession and self-dominion. This reveals the complexity of the human person. To decide for myself, I have to possess myself. An animal doesn't possess itself, but is possessed by its structure and nature. Animals only aguntur according to St. Thomas. Man is a being who has a structure such that he possesses himself. Man possesses himself and is possessed by himself. Man is a reality who cannot be possessed except by himself. Man is sui iuris. From the structure of self-possession comes the structure of self-dominion. The person dominates himself and is dominated by himself. Self-possession is the condition of self-dominion. This dual structure is seen in the experience of self-determination. Perche Uomo, p. 65, talks about this. The structure of self-possession and self-dominion reveals who man is and his freedom. To be a person means to be in relation with one's own nature. To be a person means to possess human nature in the sense of the vertical transcendence. Only man lives as an I. This is already foreshadowed in the idea of suppositum, but man is a particular suppositum, conscious of his structure of self-possession and self-dominion (PU, p. 76). He possesses and dominates himself. Out of this self-possession and self-dominion he can give himself.

We mean by self-determinism two things: that I am the author of my actions (I decide), but also that I decide about myself. We turn now to this second conception. We see in experience that we are the efficient cause of our actions. But at the same time, I am not just the creator of the act but the creator of myself, determining myself. The operativity that is proper to the person determines myself. Hence I determined myself. The first object of human action is the person himself. I always want something, directing myself toward something for myself. I am always the first object of my choosing for Wojtyła. Wojtyła speaks of the objectification of myself in action. There is a dialectic between objectification and subjectification for Wojtyła. In every action, I am at the same time the object and subject of my action. The person is not the intentional object of his action, but the intentional object is other things by which we modify our person, but not in an intentional way. We have to keep this distinction in consciousness to stay straight here. Man is conscious of himself in a reflexive way, interiorizing himself. On p. 273, when I want something, I decide at the same time about myself. Our experience is not the experience of pure willing for an external object, but of my willing, of personal willing. Willing is always an actus personae. For this reason, it employs self-possession and self-determination. An irrepeatable person decides upon himself. It's not a question of the person in actu (who realizes himself like every other being) but of the actus personae. The act comes from the original irrepeatability of each person.

The objectification of the person in act that always happens is side-by-side with the subjectification. This subjectivity gives consciousness. When I act, the man experiences through this reflection on this action that it is his. This is very important for morality, one of the anthropological foundations of morality. When I act, I experience the moral value of the action and experience the effect of this moral value within me. I become through this act morally good or morally bad, that I realize myself or don't realize myself in this action. Thanks to the reflective function of the I, I experience all of this. This drama of the human person in choosing is not something outside of me, coming from the outside, but thanks to the subjectification of the person I experience all of this as mine, as something that realizes my person or not. In this way, man experiences and discovers himself as a subject who is given with an objective structure. We will speak of this structure not just as mine but as the structure of every man. In the experience of the act, we have a synthesis between objectivity and subjectivity of the person. Wojtyla writes about it on p. 281. Man experiences every desire. For this reason, it happens as a subjective fact and an act is the discovery of the subject. Through action I reveal and recognize my objective structure. When consciousness introduces this into the orbit of experience, the objectification of self-determination is derived in the subjectivity of the person who experiences himself as the I who is acting. Self-determination allows one to become someone, a person who is good or evil. All of this is given in the experience of the objectification and subjectification of the act.

In this sense, the operativity of the person is referred in the first place to himself. The structure of the human act is self-teleological. It's not that I'm always interested in myself first and that all of action is egocentric. We know from experience that it's not this way. But the first action of my action in the world is not reflective, but reflexive, not intentional, but the occasion of every action. I am also the object of my action. But I am also the first object of my responsibility. On p. 411, if man as a person possesses and dominates himself, he can respond to himself. Man has a structure that makes him the first subject of his responsibility. I have to respond to myself. I am responsible for my moral value, because I realize myself through morality. Morality is not reduced to something external to man. But it comes up within the person.

We should make a distinction between being a person in the ontological sense and in the phenomenological and axiological sense. In the first sense, man is always a person; in the second, man constructs himself through action. For this reason, we can also distinguish the ontological and moral value of the human act. Every act has an ontological value because it is the act of a person. Sartre tried to combine these two values. He said that when the act is the expression of the person, it has positive moral value. For Sartre and the existentialists, the act that follows the common opinion is the only evil act, because it doesn't show his authenticity. For Wojtyla, this is a condition of moral action, but not a sufficient one. The act has to be an act of the person, ontological, but this is not sufficient, because the act has to be good. For the act to be good, it also has to be something more than we've spoken of up until this point — a relationship with objective reality. Not every act constitutes the fulfillment of the person, even if it is personal. Only a morally good act realizes the person. From the ontological point of view, every act realizes the person. But not every act realizes the person from the anthropological or moral point of view, only good acts. The possibility of fulfillment or non-fulfillment of the person points to the contingency of man. This metaphysical object has its way of expressing itself in our experience. We are contingent beings. We experience our realization as something that is given to us as a task. Because we are persons, this realization is not just ontological but depends on ourselves.

I am free because I depend on myself and not on objects of my willing. In the act of personal willing, I experience this. This is not everything, naturally. When I will or choose something in the developed sense of the choice, according to what modality do I choose among the various goods that attract me? Only on the basis of my willing this or that, and I will in this way? Or is there something in the experience of human liberty that is more and on the basis of which I decide in cases like this? Wojtyla says that there is something more. This we'll speak after vacation.

Truth and freedom

We spoke last time about freedom in Wojtyla, about independence and dependence. We identified the fundamental structures of the human person, of self-possession, self-dominion and what allows the person to transcend himself through self-determining, free choices. Today we will try to finish this analysis of freedom by covering another element that is constitutive for the experience of freedom and for the experience of morality. This will be a clear passage from anthropology to ethics.

This analysis we're doing today is at the heart of Wojtyla's anthropology in *The Acting Person*. It manifests the whole meaning of human transcendence. Up until now, we've analyzed intentional willing. We pass now to the analysis of the decision. In the first place, it is necessary to observe that in decision, in concrete choice, it reveals the personal character of willing, of directing oneself toward an object. It's more than a direction toward an object but a self-direction toward an object. This is at the center of the person. This personal center is clearly present. Naturally the values exercise a certain fascination on the person. According to his most fundamental instincts (self-preservation and sex), the world attracts him. There is an impulse coming from an instinct that is a fundamental reference point in the concrete decision of a person.

We can imagine receiving a letter that contained information that a friend had betrayed us. Our first reaction would be anger, maybe then vengeance, but then we would realize that certain data in this letter stand in contradiction to facts we know. Then we may begin to realize that our friend hadn't betrayed us. We no longer want to seek revenge. Our emotional reaction and our willing and reactions have undergone a test of truth. They are not the foundations of our choice. There exists a natural spontaneous reaction between truth and will, between truth and freedom. Man doesn't want to act on the basis of whatever value, but on the basis of a true value, on the basis of the truth about the good. This relation between freedom and truth is presented as part of our internal experience, not as something imposed on us from the outside. It is something that is part of the structure of our will.

The great Medieval thinkers realized this relationship between truth and freedom by defining the will as an appetitus rationalis. There is a tendency (appetite) that has a special character (rational). The proper good of the reason, however, is the truth. To head toward the good is to head toward what is truth, what the reason has recognized as the true good. Wojtyla takes this definition of the will up in *The Acting Person* and subjects it to phenomenological analysis. In his language, he expresses this reaction between freedom and truth speaking about the truth about the good, as a basis of the decision and the transcendence of the person in act. We already tried to demonstrate what the transcendence of the person means. There's a horizontal transcendence in which the person transcends the limits of his subjectivity toward objective reality. There is also a vertical transcendence which we'll soon get into.

Man can choose among the various values because he doesn't depend on any of them, but rather on himself. But choice is not just a simple directing oneself to one value beyond other values. It's more than "I want in this way," and basta. But there is an ulterior moment, the moment of truth. Wojtyla says in *The Acting Person* (p. 333), the specific reference of the truth enters into the very act of the intentionality of willing. Man, insofar as he is a person, seeks the good but seeks the true good, the truth about the good. This constitutes the intrinsic principle of his willing and determines the sense of his willing. We can say that the transcendence of the person in the act is a transcendence toward the truth. This is a transcendence in the truth and not just toward the truth, because this intrinsic reference of willing to the truth explains how the will can be independent from the objects. We tried to show this during the last lecture. Man focuses on this objective value in truth. Wojtyla (p. 381) says that man is more than a passive mirror reflecting objects, but maintains a specific preeminence through the truth. It's a question of man's superiority in the truth, which implies a certain distance from the objects that is inserted in the spiritual nature of the person. We can say, interpreting Wojtyla, that this reference to the truth, the possibility to know the objective truth, makes freedom possible.

There seems to be here an idea very similar to Maritain's work on the first concepts of moral philosophy, where he speaks of the first act of freedom. This is a very interesting idea. What is this first act of freedom according to Maritain? It's an act in which a child chooses something in virtue of its intrinsic value. Maritain speaks of a child

who for the first time to tell the truth not because he fears the punishment for lying, but because the truth is valuable. The truth has a value that must be respected. If it is like Maritain says, then between freedom and truth there is no opposition, like post-modern philosophy alleges, but in the very possibility of knowing the truth we find the condition for rendering the truth possible. To know and recognize the truth, we are free beings but also dependent beings.

We can define freedom as the independence from objects of intentional acts and the double-dependence on the self and on the truth. Man experiences himself as a rationally free being dependent on the truth. In this consists the full sense of the transcendence of the person. According to Wojtyla, transcendence is the other name for the person. I depend on myself and on the truth. In this moment, we can make an objection in our experience. Our experience shows us that we don't always choose according to the truth that we know. It happens, unfortunately too often, that even when we know the truth, we choose that which is not true. This happens not by error or ignorance but because of weakness or even wickedness. In religious action, an action like this is a sin. In ethical language, we speak of a morally evil action. On p. 439, to speak of sin or moral evil, it is revealed that in the human will there is an intrinsic dependence on the truth. We can say that this reference to the truth is sometimes something that doesn't happen in all choices. But we can explain how we experience as a sin this infidelity to the truth. This is the most original part of our experience of morality. This is the most decisive part and important part of moral experience, which is the source of morality. It is the experience of our dependence on the truth. This experience of our dependence on the truth we, in an experimental way, come into contact with moral duty. This experience is within our experience of the truth and of morality.

Duty is within this experience. Kantian duty was conceived only in a formal way: you have to do it because it is a duty. This is the most pure form of the categorical imperative and the most profound experience of morality for Kant. You have to do something. This concept of duty is not present in Scheler, who focused on values. It was considered extraneous to the truth morality. Wojtyla tries to retain what is true in both positions without maintaining their unilateral nature. He speaks of values as part of the criteria for a choice. They are necessary conditions for moral choices. There needs to be more than a good value, but also a motivation. The motivation is not identified with determination. With values, there is associated another element, the judgment on the values. This element of rational judgment wasn't present in Scheler as we remember. He spoke solely of the emotive aspect of values. This moment of rational judgment happens in a way by which we can distinguish the correctness of the choice and its authenticity. It's one thing to choose in an authentic way; it's another to choose according to that which is true. These values will have to be followed in my action.

In Sartre, values were everything. Sartre said adultery is good if it's following the interior values. For Wojtyla, the rational judgment on values comes to a different conclusion based on the truth of the values. It focuses on something beyond this emotionally strong experience. In force of its truth, the value becomes an object of my self-determination. On p. 347 of *The Acting Person*, Wojtyla says that in the experience of values we also find this judgment. The intentionality of willing is a consequence of experience of values within the moment of the truth of the good, which assumes determined forms in a choice. The person is determined in the truth, by experiencing the non-active force of the truth. This is the core of the ethical thought of Wojtyla.

We see his difference from Kant. Moral duty comes from the lived experience of the truth. This is moral duty. It's not purely formal. Moral duty comes from our experience of the normativity of the truth. This is Wojtyla's definition of moral duty (p. 373), "duty is the experimental form of the dependence on the truth on which is built the truth of the person." Kant lacked this reference to the truth. The horizontal transcendence of the person consists in going beyond our subjectivity toward objective truth. What happens in this moment? By going beyond oneself in this way toward the truth, man spontaneously is identified with the truth he has come to know. This is what we see in the human spirit, the spirit of the person. The truth is manifested in a person. We can say that in this event of cognitive contact with reality (every cognitive contact), the person becomes a witness of the truth. He assumes without reflection (like the medievalists said, *in actu significato*) *in actu exercitato*, man becomes a witness to the truth to be faithful to himself. I have to be faithful to the truth that I have come to know and recognize. I have to be faithful to myself and the truth I have come to know. There is a duty to myself and a duty to the truth.

We are witnesses of both, which are rooted in the same thing. In the concrete acts of the person, they are indissoluble. They are two sides of the same experience. For Wojtyla, moral duty therefore is nothing but the normative force of the truth which is present in the experience of the person. We find this in every truth, not just with very important truths. But it is possible to show that every truth, no matter how banal, has this normative aspect when it becomes part of the knowledge of the person. Ethics, properly understood, for Wojtyla, begins with the cognitive act. Epistemology has its moral dimension precisely because the cognitive act is an *actus personae*. We will try to show this normativity in every truth.

As we said, our experience of freedom is expressed in the phrase "I can, but I don't have to" (*posso ma non sono costretto*), but it is not expressed in a full way, because our full experience of freedom is not limited to this experience of "I can, but I don't have to." We also have to add that I want to do it. We spoke about this. But there's something more: I have to do it. The full explanation of our experience of our freedom includes all three stages. We have to include this moment of moral duty, which is part of our experience of freedom. This isn't an emotional or physical constriction, but it doesn't come from outside of the experience, but from the internal law depending on the truth. There's an internal, rather than an external, duty. On page 371, Wojtyla says that the experience of the person is not just a dependence of the ego; but there is a moment of the dependence on the truth which in the ultimate analysis forms the freedom of the person. There is a subordination to the truth, which is not something that is imposed on the freedom from an external authority, but which is something that arises within through a *connaturalitas* with the truth. There is this moral bond that at the same time permits us to experience ourselves as free.

How is this normative power of the truth realized? We can give an example. During communism in Poland, many were imprisoned and given a choice to be freed by declaring their support for the regime. Many said yes. Many refused, saying they would not regain their liberty by doing so but losing it. This is a paradox. Those who were freed weren't freed; those who were still in prison were free. This illustrates the great truth about interior freedom. In *Veritatis Splendor* we see this. For man, to be truly free, he has to be faithful to himself, which means being faithful to the truth that the person has recognized. This is the situation of a Christian martyr to not betray the greatest truth of life. We see this also in Socrates, who died as a witness to the truth. He preferred to stay in prison and lose his life to remain true to everything he taught over the course of his life. Socrates gave a witness to the truth. These martyrdoms are exceptional, in which the truth is very important and worth dying for.

This is the human ethos in its purest form. The whole tradition of moral theology has maintained the absolute prohibition of the lie, with all of the fine distinctions about not always having to tell the truth. This tradition arose to maintain the subject's personal identity. The person has to remain faithful to the truth. We're speaking here of every truth, even most banal truths. In determined circumstances, such small truths have their own normative importance. We see this in St. Peter's example of answering the question about whether he knew Jesus or not. It had a normative value, which we see in Peter's threefold denial. Every truth possesses and reveals its normative dimension. *Styżycen* speaks of the trap of the truth. Once we recognize it, we cannot deny it. It obliges us. We see this in the word martyr, to be a witness. We cannot excuse ourselves from this responsibility. We said that moral duty is the experimental form of the dependence on the truth. We can ask where this dependence manifests itself. Moral consciousness is this recognition of the dependence of the person on the truth.

Traditionally, moral conscience has concerned the judgment on morally good or evil objects. But it is present in every judgment, which is more than just cognitive but normative. Moral consciousness tells us that this good is a good to do. This moment is important in the context of the passage from descriptive meanings to normative meanings, *is-ought*, formulated by Hume. He criticized it on a logical point, because there was something in the conclusion that was not present in the premises. On the logical level, Hume was right. But his conclusion that there is no passage from description to norm was wrong. This objection was made in the context of the traditional notion of the natural law, that you couldn't deduce moral duties from the natural law. But Wojtyla's response to Hume is that in moral conscience we have this passage from *is* to *ought*, from the known truth to the truth to be done. Moral consciousness reveals to us the normative aspect that was present from the beginning (p. 389). Wojtyla says that the human person in every action shows the passage from *is* to *ought*, from *X is true* to *I have to do X*. This

was not present in Scheler. In moral conscience, there is the whole normativity of morality. The norm of the encyclical HV comes from the self-understanding on the nature of man, woman and marriage. The response of Wojtyla is that moral conscience is creative in the ambit of moral truth. Moral consciousness gives to the norm its own concreteness. This doesn't create the truth of the norm, because the truth doesn't depend on my decision in consciousness. I perceive the truth in consciousness, but I don't create it. The judgment as an act is a creation of the conscience, but the truth of the judgment is not dependent on my choice. At the base of the normal power of moral conscience, stands this union between the true and a duty, between truth and norm. This is why conscience is inviolable. There is a duty to respect the moral conscience of the person.

The conscience is the ultimate subjective moral norm for me. The conscience doesn't constitute the ultimate objective criteria of my moral action. This is because of the relation with the truth. In every judgment, I can make a mistake; so with conscience. It always obliges me, although it is not always true. It is not always objectively valid. Fichte said an erroneous conscience is nonsense, but this is mistaken. He said every judgment of conscience is true. But Wojtyla says that an erroneous conscience is possible because of the relationship with truth. We may or may not see the truth. It is also relevant in the relationship with authority in the Church. We accept authority in force of the truth. Authority guarantees that that which it teaches is true. I identify myself with the truth in such a way that I remain true to my freedom and faithful to the truth itself.

In his experience, the person encounters many values, but the highest value is the value of the person himself. If it is like this, we are naturally led into the ethics of Wojtyla. If the person is like this, our attitude toward the person has to take this truth about the person as a norm of our attitude and behavior toward the person. In the history of ethical thought, there were different frameworks of morality. Many used norm, to constitute the whole ethical context. In Wojtyla, we speak of ethical personalism, focusing on the person who is the norm of morality, who defines the whole moral order. The person has his value. It's worth it to see this ethical personalism within the background of the history of ethical thought. This will show us his ethical originality.

May 12, 2000
Classes 21-22

Integration

We're nearing the end of the course. We have to say some words on the important concept of integration within the anthropology of Karol Wojtyla. We don't have the chance to spend as much time as we should on this, but we'll give the general idea. Last week we spoke about the transcendence of the human person, which captures that which is most intimately personal. We have seen how the person transcends through the structure of self-determination and self-dominion. The person transcends the events that just happen in man. The actus humanus is different from the actus hominis that occur within man. It's not possible to understand the dynamic totality of the person and his actions if they are not understood through the perspective of the transcendence of the person in charity. Charity allows the person to be free. Nevertheless, to understand fully the person — the person is his act — we cannot stop at the level of transcendence, because the person exceeds transcendence. We have to analyze those mechanisms that happen in the person. These are integrated within the total picture of the person.

We have our body and cannot forget this. We experience transcendence from our body, but we cannot violate our internal realization that we are our body as well. We experience that we are our bodies and everything that happens within our body has a personal dimension. There's the need to integrate these experiences, because man is the unity of soul and body, and has a task to live according to his nature. His experience needs to be coherent, and we'll see why today. The theme of integration we have to consider astride transcendence. We will also speak of participation later.

The transcendence of the person remains deprived of the support of concrete existence and the energy that comes from it, because human existence is corporal. We can say that self-determination and self-dominion is placed in an

active dimension in which the person is the subject who governs and belongs to himself. We tried to show this in the analysis of freedom. It also presupposes a passive moment. Through integration, this passive moment in the person, one submits to this active part of the person. Man isn't a simple assemblage of different structures that constitute him, but is a unity of all of these structures that have as a foundation the transcendence of the person in his action.

From the point of view of our experience, we can analyze this structure and this concept of integration starting from the negative philosophical point of view of disintegration. There are several levels in the human person. When we know the opposite of something, we can learn something about the positive side. There is a somatic level in the human person. When I don't have self-dominion over the members of my body, I have to try to achieve it. This doesn't touch on the moral level of the person, but is naturally a certain impediment to one's self-realization. That which isn't integration in the human person prevents this. This is important for the person. We can think of the case of a paralyzed man. This disintegration prevents this in some way. Integration, we can say provisionally, is the possession of one's body. Even Freud said the first stage of maturity is the possession of one's body.

There is also a disintegration at the psychic level. In this case, we're speaking of psychic maladies, which have been studied by psychiatrists and psychologists. This is a pathology of the personality. From the moral point of view, this is not a moral vice. But it prevents to a great degree the realization of the human person. Beyond the different classifications of psychic maladies, we can say that the person is not capable of self-dominion and self-determination. The laws of this psychic maladies do not just come from the biological or material aspect of man. These maladies wouldn't be integrated within the person and the person would not be integrated. This would be a limit to the transcendence of the human person, who would not be capable of orienting this rebel ego within him. We can speak of disintegration at the spiritual level. The level of transcendence is really the spiritual level of man. This disintegration happens when my freedom does not allow me to follow what I recognize as true. There is a duality in my personality. This is a disintegration of the person. If this is practiced in a systematic way, it can prevent in a very serious way the transcendence of the person. Man can lose control of his self at the spiritual level. It impinges on his moral life and prevents his action.

Transcendence and integration are two sides of the dynamic totality of the person and his actions. They cannot be realized except in their reciprocal relation. We cannot separate them except for study. In real experience, they also go together. The integration of the person in the act furnishes us the key to understand the psychosomatic unity of man. This unity has been affirmed throughout classical philosophical tradition, but Wojtyla is doing it in a phenomenological way. Descartes had a very difficult time recuperating this unity. Modern science as well often treats man according to the parts that constitute him. Often it is not capable of integrating scientific results within the unity of the human person. There are generalizations made on the basis of these sciences, which become too materialistic or psychological. The results of these sciences are valid, but they can be directed against man. They lack the means to integrate the various sciences. This is what Wojtyla's anthropology tries to do. They could permit us to integrate the results of the various sciences of man in a unitary vision of man that would permit us to understand man in a deeper way.

In the light of everything we've said so far, we can affirm that the unity of man can be understood only in the following way, by starting with the integrated experience of man, including the data of science and philosophy. The method Wojtyla proposes is no longer one that ignores the results of the individual sciences, but furnishes us and them the basis for their integration, with the reference to the person which only philosophy truly speaks about. Only philosophy is meta-empirical. There's a need for a later science for something that is meta-empirical that is also present in human existence. This is philosophy (and theology is built upon them as well). In the analysis of the mechanisms that have to be integrated into the person, the most important is that of the dependence of the psyche on the body and the relationship between body and psyche (soul). We begin with the body. The human body is gifted with an interiority and an exteriority. The exteriority is that which we perceive in an immediate way. When we think about a person, what comes to mind is its exterior vision. It's the vision of the person who expresses himself in the exteriority of the person. But the internal actions condition our action. We don't know what happens within us, for example, with neurotransmitters in the brain. What happens there, however, is crucial for our psyche and for

the realization of our person. On the body the psychic life depends. By psychic life here we don't mean Aristotle's anima, but the phenomenal perspective, what is manifested in our immediate consciousness. It's not material. The psyche depends on the functioning of the body.

There is also a dependence of the body on the psyche. Psychic reasoning can have a physiological or material expression, as when a person is embarrassed. This psychic reaction has corporal effects. As we've said previously, the person is expressed in the external world through his body. We speak today a lot of the language of the body, as does the Pope in the Catecheses. He analyzes the sexual act in the key of the language of the body. He shows how this act is understood, not just from the biological point of view. It cannot be understood completely from the psychological point of view either. It has to be understood from the personal point of view. The whole person is expressed in this act. If we want to understand it in a full way, we have to take into consideration everything that involves the person as a whole. This is probably the most conspicuous way the whole person is expressed in the body. In a dead body, there can continue to be some biological functioning, but it no longer is the experience of someone who possesses himself. Life is no longer personal.

In order to frame adequately the participation of the body in the actions of man, we have to remember the concept of objectification that we mentioned above. Repetitio est mater studiorum. Man can look at himself as the object of his self-dominion. This whole process of objectification and self-possession influences his actions, through his dominion over his body. The person is realized in a more primordial way through this dominion over his body. The freedom of man enters into the external world in a sense. The body is at the border between the internal and external worlds. It constitutes the freedom of man. Freedom is expressed through the body. Maurice Montague (sp?) did a lot of studies to demonstrate the bond between corporeity and freedom, in order to go beyond the Cartesian notion of man as the assembly of two substances, material and spiritual. These studies by Montague are noteworthy and important.

The body appears to us with two interiorities. The body is subject to the interiority of the person who governs and possesses it. But the body itself has its own interiority, which is a corporeal interiority. There are internal laws to the physical organic aspect of man. The human body has its own organic dynamisms. These dynamisms are called reactive. Above all, the body reacts (not acts) in contact with the environment. It reacts to external circumstances and the body is activated. This activation belongs to the vegetative process that constitutes and maintains the life of the human body. The body is activated to self-preservation and reproduction. There are stimuli coming from the outside and have a certain autonomy. We can't decide on everything; we can't control many of the vegetative processes of man. In sickness, we are often more attentive to how we cannot control all of the internal processes of the body. We cannot control them completely. There is an efficacy and a causality that is proper to the body. This happens in the person. It is not caused by the act of the person. It belongs to the person on the basis of the ontic unity of man.

Within the personal structure of man, and intrinsic to it, there is a corporeal substructure following the laws of nature and not laws of the personalistic order. This is important for the integration of the person. The integration of the person at this somatic level happens when the bodily or somatic individuality and subjectivity becomes integrated within personal subjectivity. This function of the organism allows me to realize a purpose that is personal. The intention to go to university is not the purpose of the body. To realize it, I have to make use of the dynamisms of my body. Personal integration presumes corporeal integration, that there is a self-dominion and self-possession at that level. The habit of integration of the person at this level we can call in a primordial sense, virtue, a stable habit. We're speaking not at a moral level but at the level of stable habits. When these virtues are consolidated, the perception of the operativity of the person can disappear perhaps. The virtue is the second nature of the person. When everything is functioning well in the body through the virtues, we can think of other things. The transcendence of the person is affirmed in the most important and conspicuous way when I don't have to control every movement of the body. The body in this case would be integrated and submitted to the transcendence of the human person. Psychology has this. Our access to mobility is a crossroads in the life of the person.

The different dynamisms of the body is expressed in the great instincts of man. These bodily instincts — sexual, self-preservation — are in reality a complex of different instincts. How can we interpret these different dynamisms within the context of their similarity? We can say that at the corporeal level, these great instincts of man introduce us to primary philosophical metaphysical truths. They permit man to build this integration without any prevarication or violence to man. The values are those to which the personal values of man also tend. Self-preservation implies that it is better to exist than not to exist. This introduces us to the metaphysical and moral truth that it is good to exist. We experience this in the instinct. Being is good. When we turn to the sexual instinct, we see that it reveals a metaphysical truth about the human person. Genesis tells us that it is not good for man to be alone. This instinct teaches us the truth that concerns the truth of the person himself, that the person is directed toward others and cannot be realized if not together by entering into relations with others. We encounter these values at the bodily level. The body with its own structure and dynamics needs to be integrated within the person as a whole. The body itself attacks a virus; but we can help by our decisions. On its own, the body will not prevent the attack of a malefactor. The personal level has to act in a greater way.

This is clear in the sexual distinct. Unlike animals, man doesn't realize his good proper to him simply by reacting to the actions that happen in him, that happen in the order of nature. Sexuality corresponds ultimately to the personal level of the person, in his subjective and free level. We have to extend our analysis to the psychic level of human experience. As we already said, psyche is not a synonym of Aristotle's anima, but a complex of events of the integration of being in the person that cannot be reduced to the body but also not to the spiritual level. It has its own proper laws as well. The psychic level is manifested to our consciousness. The psyche defined by Wojtyla is manifested as we saw in its reactivity and its emotivity. The dynamism of the body is reactive; the dynamism of the psyche is emotive. The emotivity of the psyche is founded on that which is reactive. Given that the psycho-physical nature expresses the unity of man, this is a way of expressing oneself through physical reactions that is legitimate. The dynamisms of the psyche, on the other hand at the same time, can be said to be only at the level of the person. Emotions or emotional reactions make the subject compenetrated by the value. This creates the climate in which the person can exercise his quality. This is the role of the emotivity within the person according to Wojtyla. This is the fruit of his study of Scheler. Emotivity allows us to feel the values in an intuitive and experiential way. Emotions present values.

Emotivity does not convince the person to act. It only presents that which is one value or another. The proper dynamism of emotivity is exhausted here. It's not true that the emotivity guides human action. It needs to be integrated in the person. The emotive aspect of the person can be directed to the true values of the person, the good, the true, the beautiful. These values receive a color for us through the emotions. We can experience it within. It's much more powerful when we feel this value rather than just theoretically think about it. This feeling of the value is important for our action. We see this bond between the emotivity and spirituality of the person. We also have to understand the relationship between emotivity and reactivity in the person. The emotive reaction is also something that happens in man. It's difficult upon waking up in the morning to say that today I'm going to fall in love. This is an emotional experience above all. In the feelings that aren't somatic impulses, the body is objectified by the psyche. We have the experience of our body through our feelings. We feel our body. The contact with our body is mediated by our feelings. It is not by chance that we say, "I'm doing well" or "I feel great," to state the state of our body within our consciousness. We have this contact with the body. On the other hand, the consciousness is aware of psychic phenomena. This is the important point concerning the self-dominion of the person. We could speak of the emotionalization of the consciousness. Sometimes the emotions become too strong such that the person would be incapable of judging according to their truth. Consciousness would be lost to emotions, like what happens in a mob mentality.

Man feels his body, his ego, and his being in the world. We have the feelings that permit us to perceive and feel great spiritual values. So that there might be an authentic perception of values, it's necessary that our feelings be directed toward various good. They have to be integrated by the known truth. As we saw, the subjective authenticity of our experience is not enough; we also have to have an objective truth. This is not the task of the feelings to tell us about this objective aspect. This is the task of the reason in contact with reality. This is the directive function of the reason, as St. Thomas talks about. The reason is competent to judge the truth. This is how Wojtyla criticizes

Scheler, because emotions are not of themselves objectively valid. Sometimes, to be faithful to this truth, we have to sacrifice our subjective wants to objective values. When a man feels something for a woman who is not his wife, he has to govern it by reason. Naturally as we said, these values are presented to the rational judgment in an abstract way. We have to have the rational experience to make these values more convincing to us. It is not ideal to act against our feelings, but rather to order them to follow objective truth. This means, from an ethical point of view, that we have to develop the moral virtues in us. From the psychological point of view, we have to develop the self-construction of the human person. This is the task of the integration of the person, to create within a just balance between emotivity and rationality.

St. Thomas has underlined the necessity that action point toward the good in a proportional way. For him the senses are the first data, that are developed by the intellect. The irascible and concupiscent appetites give the first material on the basis of which the will exerts its task guided by the reason. St. Thomas, when he turns his attention to the dynamisms and motives of the human person, focuses on a moral and psychological typology through the terms of concupiscence (focusing on the passions going to positive values) and irascible (toward negative values). His defect, perhaps, is not to give a description of the emotional dynamics that would help us to understand more exactly what the reason can and should do to support this directive role it has. For this reason, Wojtyla connects to this realization a different typology. He talks about an exertion and a profound emotionalism. At the lowest level, exertion doesn't have an intentional content. When we say we're well, we're not really talking about a value and there's no intention here. There's always a certain reaction of the body. The exertion is different from the process that generate the great and deep emotions in us. These emotions are less bound to the sensuality, but rather to the spiritual life of man. They regard the great values of the human person, the true, the good, the beauty. From this font, the great emotions of man are born, that are perceptible in an experiential way. There is this vision of the structure of emotivity given by Wojtyla which is different from traditional philosophy. Wojtyla binds it to the phenomenology of emotions, like von Hildebrand did. He developed this spiritual or intentional dimension of the emotions, whereas those before focused mainly on the material dimension of the exertions. The process from the lowest values to the perceptions of deeper values was described by psychoanalysts in the term "sublimation."

This is properly from our point of view the process of the integration of the person, that supposes that in some way this reactivity of the body and the emotivity of the psyche are integrated in a personal dimension. From the way in which each of us realizes this task of integration, there is a dependence on the unique and irrepeatable personality of each person and of the irrepeatable and irreducible access to the truth. The emotions can be crystallized in the virtues and in the emotional complexes. These are under the control of the will, of the person as he is. When these emotional complexes and emotional states are built outside of the influence of the will and the reason, they can impede the realization of the person, even the realization of his transcendence, of following the truth even when he recognizes it through the reason. For this reason, this task is very important. The emotions, the will, the body have to be ordered consciously or not toward the same values in integration. This is the objective basis for the integration of the person. The person does not have to exercise violence against himself to integrate himself and realize him, but submit all to the great values of the human person perceived by the person.

We haven't spoken of unity of body and soul, which is more metaphysical. It doesn't really fit into phenomenological experience. But this was the task of Wojtyla, who has led us to the threshold of these conceptions. Even St. Thomas says that experience doesn't give us the immediate experience of the human soul, because this is a metaphysical reality. Wojtyla's analysis gives us a confirmation of this ancient conception of man (the unity of the soul and body in hylomorphism) from the phenomenological point of view. We can speak here of the transphenomenology of Wojtyla. We have to speak of the personalist ethics of Wojtyla and the idea of intersubjectivity, which we'll cover next week.

Personalistic ethics

Today we will speak about the personalistic ethics of Karol Wojtyla and the social dimensions of this ethics, on participation as a characteristic trait of man. We start with personalistic ethics. This ethical problem is, as Wojtyla says, is considered within parentheses in *The Acting Person*. This problem is not covered in an explicit way. Morality was an intrinsic property in human acts, in which man realizes himself. But we want to focus on the ethical dimension of human action which he covered in other writings, particularly in *Love and Responsibility* as well as in the essays contained in *Perche Uomo*. His ethical orientations were carried out by his students at Lublin.

Ethics treats things that are very important for us, that we experience in daily life that are important for us. Everyone knows what Trigonometry covers. Ethics is slightly different. For man to be good it means that man has to be morally good. To achieve happiness, we can say that moral good leads to happiness, but happiness and moral good are not identified. In *The Acting Person*, Wojtyla says (p. 413) that self-realization and happiness are similar and highly related but not the same. The fundamental question of ethics for Wojtyla is about the good by which man realizes himself.

The second intuition regarding the importance of the ethical problem for men consists in the thought that my happiness, my realization, depends on me. It is the fruit of my act and the object of my responsibility. In a certain way, I can think that I am the first object of my responsibility, in the sense that I am the author of my moral good or moral evil. In the most profound sense, I am responsible for myself, for my behavior and for my self-realization. Wojtyla says (p. 407) that the responsibility for the object of the action is the responsibility of the subject. For that value that originates in the subject himself is made concrete in the action. There is a strict realization with the self-realization of the person and every act. There is a responsibility for my person that has been entrusted to me. On the other hand, and this is also interesting for our treatment of the moral problem, to be morally good means to be good for someone. We feel that a person who is concerned just with himself and with his action, we realize that there's something still missing in his moral development. There's something gratuitous in moral action, something disinterested. I can become good through my interested and disinterested attitude toward others and toward myself. It is possible for a person to see his good in exclusion from others, and this is not completely ethical yet.

Ethics is concerned with what is moral good. It concerns the human act. The human act, as we have tried to explain, constitutes the material object of ethics. The formal object is the duty, the reason for which the act is due. If it is like this, we have to confront the question of the criterion on the basis of which the action has become a duty. To speak of why an action of moral good or evil is done on the basis of relation to a criterion. This criterion is the norm of morality which is different from moral norms. They differ according to the different contexts of human action. The concrete norms is different from the norm of morality as it is, which defines the whole moral order, in relation with which we can define morality as it is. Ethics is differentiated from what we could call ethology, which would be merely descriptive of moral practices, as would happen in sociology. But if we focus on ethics, we're focusing on a normative discipline, on what is good irrespective of what is retained as morally good.

Ethics, as Wojtyla and Lublin retain, is a rational discipline, one that wants to take its start from experience which is open to everyone. It is open to moral theology, but the first step is to analyze how morality is present in our experience almost independent of whether one believes. It then will integrate with revelation. One Polish ethicist says that ethics is independent of Marx, Christ, etc. He has some validity according to Merecki, but only to a certain point. There is something original in ethics, but, we make explanations and reasonings on the ultimate causes and effects of experiences. When we look at original experience, we are doing philosophy. Theology is involved here. The starting point for Lublin is independent from the various philosophical currents and theological and sociological insights, because it is something that is given to everyone.

We know that the norm of morality is important as the criterion for all of morality. But we have to ask in what it consists. In the history of philosophy, we can individuate three fundamental responses to this question: eudamonism, deontologism, and personalism.

Eudamonism comes from Greek ethics. For the Greeks, the ultimate end of man was happiness. This was a given of nature for the Greeks. The question for them was in what happiness consisted. The philosophers were not in agreement. Some said contemplation. Some said politics. Even in the utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill, happiness was the ultimate criterion. The structure is more important than the individual articulations. Happiness is the end; the means and criteria are what are focused on. The means consist in that which respects the rationality of man, respecting the human aspect of acts heading toward the end. They respect the freedom of man, who wants to be happy. There is a realization between the end toward which he strives and his happiness. There are two tracts of moral action, its rationality and its freedom. We can identify the negative sides of this focus. Against eudamonism, Richard Herr criticized it by saying that we can imagine someone on a bed hooked up to electrical wires that can imagine total enjoyment in great pleasure. But the price would be that he could never rise from the bed and return to regular human life. He asked whether we would switch places with this person. If we say no, it would say that happiness doesn't consist in pleasure. More generally, eudamonism can be criticized generally by the lack of the presence of others or at least by the relative lack of importance of others. François Mauriac wrote about this very strongly. Others do not enter enough into this idea. Others may often become the means of my pleasure. Gilson wrote about this: he said his friends were an occasion for him to practice his virtue. This would bring up the question about the relationship with God — would he just be a means for me to achieve happiness. Human experience tells us that there must be something more. We can perhaps say that eudamonism lacks two traits of our human action that are essential. One we could call the gratuity of human moral action (its disinterested aspect) and the categorical action of human morality, as Kant individuated. Kant says that I want to do something and I have to do something are two different experiences. This categorical character, having to do something, is present in our experience. If we can say that eudamonism has individuated something true in moral experience, we can say that it leaves something that is part of our moral experience that has to be present in an adequate theory of morality. It is not completely adequate to morality.

The theory of Kant and other theories can be classified as deontological. The voluntarists can be categorized here. What is good, for them, is what God has commanded. We have to be obedient to God. Something is good because God willed it. The response of medieval moralists like Ockham to the criterion is the command of God. There could be other authorities, as in the case of Nazism. Some sustained that we have we act well because of the commands of our superiors. Can the good come merely from the command of a superior, either divine or human? The moral theory of Sartre was that the good is what I want to be good. This is a type of deontologism, an autonomous deontologism. The will of the subject himself would be determinative. The positive sides of this theory would be to retain the categorical aspect of morality. There can be a disinterested obedience to the command. But the negative sides of this position are clear. In terms of an external authority, we can look at the case of Nazism, which is obviously problematic. Everything can be justified in this way. Deontologism leads us to the negation and cancellation of human rationality. When we obey in truth, we want to know what the reason behind the command. The command doesn't constitute the truth or the justification for it. In the case of Abraham and Isaac, we see that he believed that there was a reason for the command because God had shown him on several occasions that he was good. In Sartre's example of Egid's throwing someone disinterestedly from a train (as a paradigm of free will), we see an obvious problem. Deontologism tries to save what is lost by eudamonism (particularly the categorical aspect), but threatens what eudamonism gets right, rationality and freedom. Kant saw something important, but his description is not consistent with our experience. Erich Fromm in interbellum Germany said man is most moral when he lets go of his freedom. Fromm shows that deontologism means to flee from freedom.

If these two theories have individuated something important but come up insufficient, we have to find a position that can integrated all of these traits that are important in morality, gratuity, rationality, freedom and categoricity. When we look at our moral experience, we need to have some model that includes everything. In phenomenology, we want to look at experience as a whole. In many ways, this was the approach of Socrates. Socrates said that everything was present in another and that he was the midwife. But we also see something with Dante, who wanted to see experience and re-see experience through his stories. In medical controversies, there is a general understanding at the basis of discussion, the good of the person who is sick. It's not for the money, or to make the doctor feel good, but for the good of the person. We can ask where the conviction of the need to act for the good

of the person comes from. This comes from the immediate experience that we have of the other person, that the other person is a value that requires our affirmation. Otherwise we don't really see the other person at all. To see the other person is to know the other's name. This value we can call the dignity of the person. The recognition of this value is present in many philosophical systems (Stoics, St. Thomas, Kant, etc.). It is interpreted in various ways. This ethical theory that sees in the dignity of the person the norm of morality, the principle of the whole moral order, we can call ethical personalism. It includes all of the various good points of eudamionism and deontologism, the rationality of our action, freedom of our action, disinterestedness and moral duty.

In *Love and Responsibility*, Wojtyla reformulates the second categorical imperative of Kant, not to use someone as a means but to treat him always as an end. Wojtyla says that no one has the right to use another as a means to your ends. The personalistic norm was that everytime in your conduct that someone is an object of action, the person can never be a means but always in such a way that the person involved can achieve his own ends. The focus is "only" as a means. Here it is important to mention the distinction between the dignity of the person (that doesn't increase or diminish, that is the property of the person as a whole) and the dignity of the personality (which can be more or less morally good). Two personalities are not equal in dignity, but persons always are. In this sense, we speak of ethical personalism, that we believe is an adequate interpretation of our moral experience. This can be developed in a deeper way that we don't have the chance to do here in this course.

This ethics and the philosophy of the person that we have tried to show here stand at the foundation of a social philosophy of Wojtyla, the philosophy of being a person with others. Man exists acting with others. This is an essential characteristic of human action which Wojtyla calls participation. Transcendence and integration are important and define the person. Participation is a third crucial trait. Man stands in relation with others and this is not something that is accidental, as it would be in various individualistic philosophies. At the origin of the word person there is the recognition of this fact. It developed in the discussions of the Trinity, what the relations mean. The word person had in mind this relation with another. Spaemann says we cannot speak of the person in a singular way. He called his book *Persons*, because the person always exists in relation with others. This intersubjective dimension of the person Wojtyla calls participation. He wanted to show in his philosophy the anthropology foundations of human society. The question guiding his idea is how to conceive human society so that it would respect the dignity of the human person, the norm of morality, how the personalistic dimension of the action of man can be maintained. Every act insofar as it realizes the transcendence of the person already possesses a personalistic value because it expresses the person. The personalistic value of the human person is a more essential value than the person himself (p. 721). It is a condition of the moral condition of every act. There has to be a true act of the person, a true personalistic value, at the root of every moral act.

Human society has to be organized in such a way as to allow the person to realize himself through his actions in the various contexts of action. If we had a society in which everyone did morally good acts, but in which they didn't respect the personal value of the person but forced him to do good acts, it would lack something very important. This means that we have to permit the person to do even morally evil actions in order to create the space for the person to do morally good actions. This comes within limits, particularly with actions that will do great damage to others. To respect the freedom, and the personalistic value of the action, means to permit the person to do morally evil actions. We can say that the just society is one which respects the personalistic value of the act.

We can ask here a question that is important for the foundations of Wojtyla's thought. In what society will man realize himself? He focuses on participation, which means to take a part. In the philosophical sense, participation means to take part in a society, to act together in acts. The transcendental dimension of the human person has to be respected. This is participation, as he defines on p. 731: the characteristic trait of participation indicates that man goes together with others and maintains the personalistic value of his own act and at the same time realizes that which results from common action. Participation maintains everything that results from common action. Participation is acting with others and man chooses what the others choose often because others choose the same thing. In this, he can realize himself by choosing what the others choose for the reasons they choose. He configures the interior structure of the person in this way. We have to understand everything from the perspective of the

person. For Wojtyla participation does not express merely the fact that men act together but has a normative aspect as well, that human society has to be organized.

Wojtyla analyzes two ways of organizing society to determine what participation is. These two societies (individualism and objective totalism) fail to respect participation. Individualism opposes the person and society in a zero-sum game. The good of the person is opposed to the good of the community and vice versa in this conception. Objective totalism affirms the opposite principle, by subordinating the individual to the good of the society. The true good for totalism is social as opposed to individual. We find the same conception of man in both false conceptions, because participation isn't considered part of the notion of man. Totalism resolves for the good of the community, individualism for the person, in opposition. Wojtyla says that the community has to be treated as a quasi-subject. The true subject is man as a person. It's always man who has to be realized and his good. The community doesn't possess from the metaphysical point of view a subjectivity, which is why he calls it a quasi-subject. The common good of the community is not quantitative but personalistic, which permits the realization of man through action with others. The common good is not collective or accumulative, but distributive, the good of every member of the community. The community that respects this trait of participation that is essential for the person, as well as the moral duty of the person to live this dimension, is for Wojtyla one that realizes the personalistic meaning of human life.

Wojtyla speaks of different attitudes before the society, some of which are authentic, some of which are not. The authentic attitudes are solidarity and opposition. Perhaps the movement Solidarnosc took its name from a Wojtylan article. Solidarity means for Wojtyla a constant disposition to receive and realize the person the person expects within a community. But it is also the disposition to do more, to do that which I expect of myself for others. It is not a bureaucratic notion of doing only your duty (as Weber analyzed) but to do what you expect of yourself. Solidarity is to do one's duty but seeing the task within the context of society as a whole. Opposition is an authentic attitude for the good of community. There has to be a space for opposition in every personalistic society. It's not constantly arguing against what society wants, but there always has to be space for dialogue in a society in terms of the good of society. Wojtyla wrote all of this in the communist context. Opposition is in the name of the good of society is authentic and good for Wojtyla.

The two inauthentic attitudes are conformity and stepping aside. Conformity is a minimization of personality and freedom. Havel wrote about the authority's expectations that workers would do various tasks in the work place to maintain the structure of society. Nobody believed in them and no one had the courage to oppose. Stepping aside (scansarsi) is inauthentic. It's passing the buck.

Wojtyla distinguishes two systems of reference present in our action with others. The first is the member of the community and the second is the neighbor system. These two systems don't have to be opposed, but the second always has to be present in the first. If we make an opposition between the two, we lose something. The neighbor system is more important than the community system, because everyone is my neighbor. It's much more personal. There is an invitation to participate in the humanity in every other person. The possibility of participation in the humanity of others is essential to the neighbor system.

With this focus, we can conclude our course on Person and Act in Wojtyla.

THE END